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This thesis examines the Truman administration's approach to civil 
liberties from 1948-1950, particularly with respect to legislative 
proposals to tighten internal security, which found their embodiment 
in the McCarran Act, or internal Security Act of 1950. Truman and 
his aides, most specifically but not exclusively Stephen Spingarn, 
Charles Murphy, and George Elsey, made their top priority political 
advantage, rather than the maintenance of civil liberties. 
As the Cold War intensified during the post-war period, conserva­
tives in Congress sought to outlaw the Communist Party. These 
attempts at repression threatened the individual's right to speak 
and associate freely. Aside from the constitutional issues, 
congressional attempts at anti-subversive legislation could be 
turned on New Deal Democrats, including Harry S. Truman. While the 
Truman administration initially adopted at least a strong rhetorical 
defense of civil liberties, the position of the White House softened 
as events both at home and abroad led America toward a more 
repressive atmosphere. The administration's failure to adopt a 
strong position in defense of civil liberties was actually consistent 
with earlier actions by the President, such as the creation of the 
federal loyalty program and his decision to turn over the State 
Department's loyalty files to a congressional committee. Throughout 
his struggle with Congress over the issues of internal security and 
civil liberties, Truman remained true to his background as a machine 
politician; he saw the conflict primarily in partisan terms. His 
use of the rhetoric of civil liberties was more a political expedient 
than a reflection of genuine concern. 
The first part of this thesis examines the repressive elements of 
the President's own loyalty program and his surrender of State 
Department files to a Senate subcommittee. The second part explores 
both the development of congressional proposals to combat subversion 
and the Truman administration's response to those legislative 
proposals. The third part examines the culmination of congressional 
efforts in the McCarran Act. The fourth part explores Truman's veto 
of the bill, the vote to override the veto, and the President's 
last-ditch attempt to retain political advantage through the estab­
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Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950, also 
known as the McCarran Act, on September 24, 1950, overriding 
President Harry Truman's veto of what he termed an 
ineffective and repressive bill. Among other things, the 
McCarran Act required members of the American Communist 
Party to register with the federal government and denied 
naturalization to any alien who had been involved with the 
advocacy of totalitarianism up to ten years prior to passage 
1 
of the act. The White House argued against such measures, 
claiming that "personal liberty is preserved only by not 
giving to government officers powers under which such 
2 
results can occur." Indeed, President Truman himself argued 
in his internal security message to Congress more than six 
weeks before the bill became law that "unwise or excessive 
security measures can strike at the freedom and dignity of 
the individual which are the very foundation of our society 
and the defense of which is the whole purpose of our 
3 
security measures." 
Historians have most often portrayed Harry Truman as a 
president unafraid to speak his mind, to take a stand on the 
issues, and to accept responsibility for his decisions. 
Judging from that image and the above comments, one might 
therefore conclude that Truman appreciated the duty which 
his office owed to the Constitution of the United States. 




Writers from a broad spectrum of perspectives have 
attempted to clarify and explain the dilemma of an 
administration caught up in a red scare which threatened to 
tear the fabric of American society and subvert the 
Constitution. Liberal defenders of the Truman administration 
tend to see the President and his White House staff as 
prisoners of a hostile and conservative Congress, which 
whipped up public hysteria in order to further its members' 
own political fortunes. The President and his supporters 
claim that Truman fought to preserve individual liberties as 
best he could, given the constraints imposed upon him by a 
worried nation and an intractable Congress. Truman himself 
saw his position on the Communist threat as one of careful 
balance between the dual needs for effective internal 
security measures and a clear, uncompromising defense of 
constitutional liberties. He maintained his belief in the 
constitutional validity of his loyalty program while 
criticizing Congress for passing the "extreme" McCarran 
4 
Act. 
Among the more recent liberal apologists, Alonzo Hamby 
argues in his book, Beyond the New Deal; Harry S. Truman, 
that Truman was determined to defend the Bill of Rights "as 
5 
he understood it." Truman, Hamby asserts, was not a liberal 
in the progressive, Rooseveltian tradition, but nonetheless 
sought "to provide leadership in the struggle against 
Republican conservatism and to establish a compelling 
3 
liberal identity which could attract the blocs of voters who 
6 
had sustained FDR." Alan Harper's book, The Politics of 
Loyalty, de-emphasizes Truman's own responsibility for the 
repression of civil liberties and concentrates instead on 
7 
the President's noble reaction to hostile Republicans. 
In the 1960's and 1970's, radical or revisionist 
historians criticized the Truman administration for 
contributing to the anti-communist hysteria. They cited the 
loyalty program, the Smith Act prosecutions, and Truman's 
strident anti-communist rhetoric. 
Perhaps the foremost revisionist critic of the Truman 
administration is Athan Theoharis. In his book, Seeds of 
Repression, Theoharis essentially blames Truman for the 
debacle which the White House faced in the form of the 
McCarran Act. Theoharis points to the vigor with which the 
President carried on the Cold War, strongly opposing 
Communism in all its forms and in all places. Truman's 
red-hunting was on a par with that of Congress, claims 
Theoharis, and in this light, Senator Joe McCarthy and 
President Truman "differed not so much over ends as over 
8 
means and emphasis." "The really insidious aspect of 
Truman's rhetoric about loyalty and the McCarthyites' cries 
of betrayal," argues Theoharis, "was that it encouraged a 
popular mania for absolute security that extended beyond the 
prosecution of overt acts of disloyalty to a suspicion of 
9 
all potentially subversive ideas." Theoharis corroborates 
his charge by citing the administration's response to the 
4 
McCarran bill — the introduction of a rival anti-communist 
bill instead of concentrating on defeating McCarran's own 
legislation — as an event that "undermined his (Truman's) 
attempt to emphasize the importance of civil libertarian 
considerations. Indeed, his introduction of an alternate 
bill served only to affirm an apparent need for more 
10 
effective legislation." Theoharis effectively illustrates 
the gulf which existed between Truman's rhetoric concerning 
civil liberties and his vigorous response to the Cold War 
and Communism at home. 
Michael Belknap also attacks Truman. Belknap claims 
that the administration pursued the prosecution of leading 
Communist Party members under the Smith Act because the 
White House needed to shore up its war against Communism at 
home in the United States. Fearing Republican attacks on the 
administration's "barren" efforts, the Justice Department 
sought a guilty verdict despite its own attorneys' warning 
that a conviction would be difficult. Belknap also asserts 
that the Justice Department delayed public notice of the 
Communists' indictment on June 29 until after the Democratic 
National Convention (scheduled for July 12-15) so as to 
avoid pushing leftist liberals into Henry Wallace's 
11 
third-party camp. Belknap differs with Theoharis by 
arguing that Truman pursued anti-communism at home because 
of political pressures rather than personal convictions. 
Other critics of the Truman administration include Bert 
Cochran, whose book, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency, 
5 
attacks the President's handling of the McCarran bill in a 
fashion similar to Theoharis, claiming that events 
surrounding the McCarran Act revealed the way in which the 
President, the Democratic liberals, and the "reactionaries" 
all contributed to the passage of repressive legislation. 
Truman vetoed the bill because of its repressive measures, 
while pressing his own bill whose major distinction was that 
the witch hunt would be left in the hands of the FBI and the 
Attorney General. The liberals, argues Cochran, decided to 
fight fire with fire by introducing an emergency detention 
bill which, for repressive elements, matched the McCarran 
proposal. The reactionaries, of course, believed they were 
12 
saving the country from subversion from within. 
In her book, Crisis on the Left, Mary McAuliffe argues 
that liberals in the post-war period, facing a conservative 
"resurgence" due to the Communist threat and renewed 
domestic prosperity, abandoned the united front which they 
pursued during the New Deal. The ACLU expelled members of 
the Communist Party; major labor unions did the same, and 
the ADA attacked Henry Wallace and his liberal Progressive 
Party in an attempt to compete with Republicans for the 
support of America's vital center. McAuliffe claims that 
the "new liberalism" was "realistic," cautious, elitist, and 
centrist. By excluding the left from the arena of 
permissible debate, the liberals "lost sight of vital civil 
13 
liberties and limited the free marketplace for ideas." 
This thesis attempts to avoid the pitfalls which beset 
6 
the above historians, who tended either to be liberal 
apologists or post-Vietnam writers criticizing Truman from 
the left. There are, of course, interpretations which fall 
in between the viewpoints outlined above. Nevertheless, the 
Truman administration's approach to the debate between 
internal security and civil liberties, it appears, is best 
viewed from a perspective which takes due notice of the 
intense political pressures of the period. There existed a 
tense conflict between Congress and the White House which 
reflected to a significant, if not all-encompassing, degree 
the conflict between conservative Republicans and New Deal 
Democrats. Such a political setting served especially to 
confuse non-partisan issues with partisan maneuvers, 
distorting an already complicated development. 
Into this fray was injected Harry Truman, the 
"Gentleman from Pendergast." Truman began his political 
career in the 1920's as part of the infamous Pendergast 
Machine in Missouri, owing his first office to the power and 
influence of Mike Pendergast. Truman's early days as a 
politician were consumed with administering contracts for 
the Kansas City machine, and the corruption which ran 
rampant within the Pendergast fold taxed Truman's 
integrity. "Am I an administrator or not? Or am I just a 
crook to compromise in order to get the job done? You 
14 
judge, I can't," he once wrote. William Pemberton claims 
that Truman "narrowed his ethical framework" during the 
Pendergast period. "In fact," says Pemberton, Truman "could 
7 
uphold his ethics only because they were narrow and 
unsophisticated." The future president, he argues, 
"shrugged off the ethical dilemmas, focused on practical 
problems, and became increasingly impatient with those who 
15 
raised questions about his and his associates' conduct." 
Even Richard Kirkendall, who is very sympathetic to Truman, 
claims that while in Missouri, Truman "accepted one of the 
basic rules of machine politics and appointed its members to 
county offices that he controlled." After entering the 
Senate, Truman obtained patronage for the Pendergast 
Machine. Kirkendall notes that, as a senator, Truman shifted 
his political focus somewhat from "old-deal" Democratic 
policy to the New Deal's emphasis on labor unions and social 
workers. "The change," says Kirkendall, "reflected Truman's 
tendency to accept rather than rebel against the major 
16 
realities of politics." As a senator and loyal party man 
Truman supported Roosevelt's court-packing plan, revealing 
that, in the words of Kirkendall, Truman's commitments "were 
17 
to people, not to doctrines." 
It is fair to bring this portrait of the early Truman 
to the White House of the late 1940's and early 1950's. 
President Truman did not change his role as an organization 
man upon taking over the job left by Franklin Roosevelt. In 
fact, a detailed exploration of the Truman administration's 
experience with the issues of internal security and 
individual rights supports the contention that Truman was 
primarily a political creature, and the desire to maintain 
8 
political standing, rather than a deep regard for the 
Constitution, marked his approach to the issues. This fact 
asserts itself in several ways. First, the Truman 
administration, despite its rhetoric, held no great respect 
for the values embodied in the First, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments. The operation of the Federal Loyalty Program 
created by President Truman illustrated how the hysteria of 
the times, with its concomitant emphasis on the repression 
of civil liberties, beset the executive branch of the 
government as well as the legislative. The loyalty program 
was the most glaring example of how the Truman 
administration itself contributed to the national hysteria. 
Second, the President's decision to release State Department 
loyalty files to a Senate subcommittee in the Spring of 
1950, after repeated denials based on arguments reflecting a 
concern for the rights of affected individuals, revealed how 
political pressures could influence a President whose 
rhetoric appeared uncompromising. 
An examination of the above two issues paves the way 
for a more detailed exploration of the Truman 
administration's response to the internal security 
legislation repeatedly proposed by Congress from 1948 to 
September 1950. When one becomes acquainted with the 
equivocation and vacillation which marked the Truman 
presidency, one can understand more easily the complex 
interplay of forces which culminated in the passage of an 
extremely repressive internal security bill and the 
9 
embarrassment of an already unpopular administration. In 
essence, the President continued his partisan perspective, 
preferring to see the debate as a political contest rather 
than as a constitutional or security issue. This approach, 
it appears, contributed to the passage of the McCarran Act 
on September 24, 1950. 
A final note is needed to forestall any questions 
concerning the relationship between Truman and his 
administration. Harry Truman himself left comparatively few 
letters and remarkably few memos, communiques, or other 
documentation of his views in executive files. His 
administrative assistants, however, left voluminous 
correspondence which is stored at the Harry S. Truman 
Library in Independence, Missouri. One finds that Truman 
left it to his assistants, primarily Stephen J. Spingarn, 
George Elsey, Charles Murphy, Clark Clifford, Donald Dawson, 
and David Lloyd, to orchestrate the President's 
communication with just about everyone outside the White 
House. One need not fault the President for delegating 
authority; one must, however, recognize that the chief 
executive is responsible for advice he takes from his 
subordinates. It is important to understand Truman's 
relationship with his staff if one is to make sense of the 
official papers of the Truman presidency. 
10 
ENDNOTES 
1. Analysis of H.R. 9490, September 22, 1950, McCarran Veto folder, 
Files of Charles Murphy (hereafter Murphy Files), Harry S. Truman 
Library, Independence, MO (hereafter HSTL). 
2. Ibid., p. 9. 
3. Memo, August 17, 1950, Internal Security—Pending Legislation 
folder, papers of George Elsey (hereafter Elsey Papers), HSTL. 
4. Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1956), pp. 
283-287. 
5. Alonzo Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 413. 
6. Ibid., p. xx. 
7. Alan Harper, The Politics of Loyalty (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood 
Pub. Corp., 1969. 
8. Athan Theoharis, Seeds of Repression (Chicago: Quadrangle books, 
1971), p. vii. 
9. Ibid., p. 101. 
10. Ibid., p. 117. 
11. Michael Belknap, ed., American Political Trials (Westport Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 237-38. 
12. Bert Cochran, Harry Truman and the Crisis Presidency (New York: 
Funk and W&gnalls, 1973). 
13. Mary McAuliffe, Crisis on the Left (Aniherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1978), p. 146-47. 
14. William Pemberton, Harry S. Truman (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 
1989), p. 22. 
15. Ibid., p. 23. 
16. Richard Kirkendall, "Truman's Path to Power," Social Science 43 
(April, 1968): 67-73. 
17. Ibid. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Judging Truman's administration solely by its rhetoric, one might 
well conclude that his administration's concern for the civil liberties 
of the American people came from a heartfelt appreciation of the 
importance of individual rights in American society. Truman's veto of 
the McCarran Act could easily reaffirm such notions. However, upon 
closer examination of the Truman administration's record on civil 
liberties, one finds that the preservation of the rights of the 
individual was of secondary importance to the White House under Truman. 
The President's concern for civil liberties did not match his, or his 
administration's, desire to ensure national security and to pre-enpt 
Republicans in Congress. His prosecution of the Cold VJSar, exemplified 
by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, found its complement on 
the heme front in the form of an incautious disregard for 
Constitutional liberties. In order to understand the discrepancy 
between the rhetoric and the reality of the Truman administration's 
position on the McCarran Act, it is necessary to trace the 
administration's involvement with the issue of civil liberties in the 
years before 1950. Two particularly enlightening examples of the 
President's lack of genuine concern for individual rights are his 
establishment of the Federal Loyalty Program in 1947 and his release of 
confidential state department loyalty files to an investigating 
ccumittee in the spring of 1950. 
The President launched an ambitious and sweeping Federal Loyalty 
Program with Executive Order 9835 an March 21, 1947. The program sought 
11 
12 
to investigate all federal enployees and applicants for possible 
connections to activities and associations (particularly carmunist and 
communist front organizations) which aimed to subvert the policies of 
the federal government. The order required each department and agency 
head to submit to the FBI the names of all its enployees. The FBI then 
checked those names against its records for evidence of disloyal 
activities and associations, as determined by standards set forth in 
the order. Upon the discovery of "negative information," the FBI 
conducted a full field investigation, and sent any suspicious 
information back to the agency loyalty board. If the loyalty board 
found the charges warranted further action, it sent a letter and 
charges to the employee or applicant, who could request a hearing. 
Final authority rested with the agency head."'" Frcm March of 1947 to 
December of 1952, the FBI undertook to clean the federal service of all 
disloyal individuals. The Bureau conducted 6,644,496 background 
checks, leading to 25,748 full field investigations which resulted in 
490 persons being dismissed frcm or denied federal employment. An 
extra 5,921 individuals quit the government or withdrew their 
2 applications in the face of investigation. 
The White House touted the provisions of the program which ensured 
that the freedoms of the millions of federal enployees which came under 
investigation would not be trespassed. Employees could request a full 
hearing, complete with affidavits and witnesses, when they found 
themselves charged with disloyalty. They could appeal a negative 
finding to a Loyalty Review Board in the Civil Service Cccrmissian. 
Furthermore, they received a full record of the charges brought against 
13 
them, "as detailed as security considerations permit," as well as a 
transcript of the hearings, which were kept informal and private. The 
order required that "reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the 
person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States." 
This standard required proof of disloyalty, thereby (at least in 
theory) mitigating the effects of hearsay and rumor on an employee1 s or 
3 
applicant's status. These procedures, as well as others, were to 
"assure that the civil liberties of Government enployees shall receive 
4 
the fullest protection." In fact, the order itself asserted that 
"equal protection frcm unfounded accusations of disloyalty must be 
5 
afforded the loyal enployees of the Government." 
The loyalty program, however, infringed upon the rights of the 
individual in many ways. BO 9835 allowed that "the investigative 
agency may refuse to disclose the names of confidential informants," 
when the security of the informants or the nation would be put at risk 
by such disclosure. This effectively denied suspects such as Dorothy 
Bailey, a government employee accused of subversive associations, the 
right to confront their accusers and, hence, the evidence presented 
g 
against them. The actual workings of the loyalty program did not 
always live up to its meager safeguards. The order claimed that "the 
presence within the Government service of any (emphasis added) disloyal 
or subversive person constitutes a threat to our democratic 
processes." The emphasis on absolute security led the program toward 
inefficient and extreme attempts to catch subversives. For example, on 
April 28, 1951, President Truman issued Executive Order 10241, amending 
BO 9835 to replace the "reasonable grounds" basis for belief that a 
14 
person was disloyal with a standard which accepted "reasonable doubt" 
7 
of a person's loyalty. This amendment placed the burden of proof on 
g 
the accused and gave greater weight to hearsay and rumor. The loyalty 
program itself stimulated excessive zeal for protection, thereby 
violating the balance between internal security and individual rights 
called for in Executive Order 9835. 
Other problems existed as well. The Attorney General controlled 
the listing of subversive organizations and their members (frcm which a 
comparison could be made to the list of the federal payroll in order to 
find enployees with dangerous connections). The Attorney General alone 
had the power to list organizations, without a hearing, and his 
justifications for doing so remained a secret. The government argued 
that much information upon which it chose to act had to remain 
confidential in order to protect national security. Moreover, 
organizations could not appeal their placement on the Attorney 
General's list. These developments had a twofold effect: government 
secrecy often subjected an organization's members to wrongful 
investigation by the FBI; and there developed the tendency of wary 
individuals to restrict their associations. An employee or applicant 
of the federal government may have innocuously joined an organization 
which claimed to promote liberal programs but had actually been 
infiltrated and controlled by Ccmnunists, thus becoming a Communist 
front. As a result, uninformed loyalty boards treated an innocent 
9 
individual as a co-conspirator of ccmnunists. The defects of the 
program inspired wary persons to restrict their circle of associations 
and placed a premium on conformity, encouraging orthodoxy while 
15 
discouraging the free trade in ideas.^ 
These serious flaws in the President's program served to diminish 
rather than preserve the rights of federal enployees. The program 
itself legitimized the review of political beliefs and associations, 
thereby increasing pressures to extend the program during periods of 
crisis. Moreover, the loyalty program contributed to the hysteria of 
the times by affirming the claims of the right that the government was 
susceptible to subversion from within, thereby failing to calm the 
public's anxiety. In addition, by violating accepted standards of 
procedure, and by validating the tactics of right-wingers in their 
efforts to establish order and conformity, the program played into the 
hands of demagogic spokesmen such as Senator Joseph McCarthy 
(R-Wis.).11 
An exploration of Truman's loyalty program illustrates two trends 
for which the President was responsible. First, careful examination of 
the documentary record reveals the fact that, in the minds of the White 
House, the need for national security, or at least the appearance of 
national security, superceded the desire to preserve the rights of the 
individual. Second, the effects of the program actually contributed to 
public anxiety and to hasty Congressional action. The Truman 
administration once again failed to insist on the preservation of 
fundamental liberties in the spring of 1950. 
The President's response to McCarthy's charges that spies were 
working in the State Department was another illustration of how Trunan 
managed to sacrifice both American civil liberties and his cwn 
political strength. There existed among the far right in 1950 those 
16 
who believed that recent setbacks in foreign affairs, such as the 
Ccmriunist victory in China in 1949 and the development of a Soviet 
nuclear device, could not have occurred without the aid of subversives 
acting within the United States Government. The discovery that Klaus 
Fuchs, an important nuclear scientist, had delivered atomic secrets to 
the Russians only reinforced the mounting concern of a sizeable portion 
of the population unwilling to accept that the United States government 
was less than omnipotent. These fears found expression in the actions 
of members of Congress such as Karl Mundt, Richard Nixon, Pat McCarran, 
and especially Joseph McCarthy. McCarthy, the most vitriolic and 
demagogic Republican Senator of the 81st Congress, exploded on to the 
national scene with his Lincoln's Birthday address to the Republican 
Women's Club of Wheeling, West Virgina, on February 9, 1950. In this 
speech, he boldly announced that he had in his possession a list of 205 
known Ccmnunists working in the State Department with the silent 
approval of Secretary of State Dean Acheson. The number of Ccmnunists 
on McCarthy's list fluctuated in succeeding speeches, dropping to as 
lew as 57 and finally settling at 81. The uproar was instant and 
national in scope. In response, the Foreign Relations Carmittee set 
out to investigate McCarthy's charges, and gave itself the right to 
subpoena State Department loyalty files, files which came under the 
12 
direct control of the President. 
Truman found his administration under attack frcm two directions. 
One side alleged that his State Department contained a nest of spies. 
Frcm the other, a Congressional ocmnittee attempted to breach the 
separation of powers provided for by the Constitution. Truman's 
17 
response to this crisis revealed a political approach toward civil 
liberties which undermined not only the Constitution but his own 
credibility as well. Fran the start the White House clearly and 
adamantly denied that Congress had the right to subpoena executive 
files. The administration pointed to earlier research which found 
that, among others, Presidents Washington, Jefferson, and Tyler refused 
13 
to relinquish confidential information to Congress. The real weight 
of the administration's argument, however, consisted of its emphasis on 
the fact that information in the files was often unproven, and to 
release this information to the public would unfairly punish innocent 
enployees. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, agreed with the 
administration's stand, pointing out hew release of confidential files 
"might be made under circumstances which would deny the aggrieved to 
publicly state their positions."(sic) Hoover went on to argue that 
reports, "if publicized, could be subject to misinterpretation, quoting 
out of context, or used to thwart truth, distort half truths, and 
14 
misrepresent facts." McCarthy attempted to force Truman's hand by 
claiming that the only way to disprove his allegations was to open the 
files. In March of 1950, a tough election year, McCarthy's ploy almost 
worked. The President's aides advised Truman to make the files 
available, but with restrictions. The New York Times saw this move as 
a politically motivated catprcnu.se by Truman, who feared both setting a 
15 
dangerous precedent and leaving McCarthy's loaded charges unanswered. 
The White House planned to maintain the upper hand regarding the 
release of State Department files. The reoaimendatians of Donald 
Dawson, assistant to the President, proposed that the caimittee must 
18 
state its evidence as to the disloyalty of an employee. This 
stipulation would serve to "smoke out" McCarthy's evidence. 
Furthermore, Truman would maintain total control over the files 
throughout the proceedings. And lastly, in order to protect 
investigative methods and personnel, the ccrrmittee would receive a 
White House summary of the files, not the files themselves, for its 
records.16 But as McCarthy's attacks on the State Department increased, 
the President's resolve to deny access to Department files stiffened. 
Truman's refusal concentrated attention on the flimsiness of the 
senator's charges, and in response McCarthy reluctantly began to 
release the names of "card carrying Ccmnunists" in the Department. His 
charges against Dorothy Kenyan, John Service, and Haldore Hansen were 
weak and essentially insupportable. This reinforced his efforts to 
obtain more information, which might or might not have been legally 
admissible in a court of law but which would nevertheless be useful for 
17 
smearing his opponents, frcm the restricted files. 
Officials in the Truman administration advised the President to 
deny the subcommittee access to Department files for reasons concerning 
both civil liberties and investigative effectiveness. Attorney General 
J. Howard McGrath wrote the President that to disclose the loyalty 
reports, with their unproved allegations, would be "the grossest kind 
of injustice to innocent individuals." Release of hearsay and rumor 
could be devastating to reputations, he claimed, because "we all knew 
18 
that a correction never catches up with an accusation." J. Edgar 
Hoover reinforced McGrath1s arguments when he spoke before the 
Subccxrmittee on March 27. Citing security reasons as well as civil 
19 
liberties arguments, Hoover pointed out that "names of persons who by 
force of circumstance entered into the investigation might well be 
innocent of any wrong." "We cannot," he argued, "disregard the 
fundamental principles of carman decency and the application of basic 
19 
American rights of fair play." The next day, Truman sent a letter to 
Millard Tydings, chairman of the Subcommittee, denying Tydings access 
to the loyalty files. Reiterating the arguments of McGrath and Hoover, 
Truman told Tydings that it was the President's responsibility to take 
care that "innocent people — both those under investigation and those 
20 
who have provided information — not be unnecessarily injured." 
Truman championed the rights of the individual again in April when, in 
a speech to the Federal Bar Association, he claimed that "our system of 
justice preserves the freedom and dignity of the individual, and his 
right to think and speak as he feels and to worship as he pleases. It 
protects him in the assertion of his rights even against his own 
government." The files contained unproven information, he argued, and 
to release them would subject cleared people to retrials in the 
21 
newspapers. 
One would gather frcm his public statements that the President 
refused to release the State Department's loyalty files because he 
believed that to do so would constitute an intolerable invasion of 
individual rights. He apparently made his stand with the support of 
high officials in his administration. Yet for all his arguments, based 
on precedent, investigative efficiency, and constitutional liberties, 
on May 4, 1950, Truman relented and opened the 81 files which McCarthy 
sought to examine. The chairman of the investigating subcommittee, 
20 
Millard Tydings, claimed that the cases were identical to those 
investigated three years earlier by Congressional committees. In light 
of the fact that the data had already been examined, he argued, the 
President was not creating a precedent by opening the files. Senator 
Kenneth Wherry (R-Neb) countered this assertion with the claim that 
Truman released the files because he was afraid of the public's 
22 
reaction on his upcoming tour of the West. 
Truman's disclosure of the files may or may not technically have 
been a sacrifice of the civil liberties of federal employees. If one 
accepts the President's assertion that the release was not a precedent 
(and therefore not a threat to individual rights) one can only conclude 
that his and his administration's previous stand relating the secrecy 
of the files to civil liberties was mere rhetoric. What is more 
plausible is the argument that the President's release of the files did 
not constitute a breach of the separation of powers. Hie fact that the 
files contained unproven information which could be used to damage 
employees' reputations remained. The disclosure of the files 
illustrated how pressure from the administration's political opponents 
influenced the actions of the White House. By exposing civil liberties 
to the whim of impermanent political developments, Truman weakened both 
the Constitution and, at the same time, the power of his own 
presidency. As the debate over Ccmnunist subversion intensified in 
succeeding months, the President would again make victory in the 
political arena, not the maintenance of individual liberties, his 
number one priority. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
President Truman's opposition to the Internal Security Act of 1950 
did not represent a clear deviation from his previous stand on internal 
security legislation, because his administration's record on civil 
liberties was mixed. Despite his demonstrated disregard for civil 
liberties at times, the President on more than one occasion defended 
the rights of the individual in America. Indeed, one can trace a 
libertarian attitude in Truman as far back as 1941, when, as a Senator, 
he opposed bills giving the federal government power to tap phones.^" 
However, from 1948 until Congress passed the McCarran Act in September 
of 1950, the Truman administration adopted a half-hearted position in 
the face of pressure from domestic forces and from world events. Hiese 
pressures led not only to a decrease in the President's political 
strength, but also, due to the President's disregard for individual 
rights, to a decline in the strength of civil liberties in America. An 
examination of the Truman administration's handling of the initial 
internal security legislation proposals revealed the weakness of 
executive resolve in the area of individual rights and reflected the 
administration's perception of issues as political rather than 
fundamental, and therefore open to compromise. Congress proposed 
several pieces of repressive legislation, to which civil libertarians 
responded with great energy. The White House, meanwhile, rode the 
fence, one side of which contained the liberals and the Constitution. 
The other side contained Congress, a nervous public, and the perceived 




The Truman administration watched concern for internal security in 
the United States mushroom during the post-war period but failed to 
note its own contribution to the crisis. In addition to the debacles 
of the loyalty program and the release of the security files, the White 
House continued to undercut civil liberties in its fight with Congress 
over internal security matters. Alarmed at the character of 
anti-subversive legislation in states such as Maryland, New York, and 
New Jersey, Truman's special assistant Stephen Spingarn wrote in April 
of 1949 that "since the end of World War II there has been an cminous 
trend in the United States toward the increasing curtailment of freedom 
2 
of expression and opinion...." According to Spingarn, the actions of 
Congress during 1948 and 1949 paralleled those of the above mentioned 
states. Anti-carnrunist bills sponsored by Senators Mundt, Ferguson, 
and Representative Nixon in 1949 were actually reintroductians of the 
1948 Mundt-Nixon bill, H.R. 5852, which sought to control and reveal 
the workings of the American Ccmnunist Party. Senators Mundt, Ferguson, 
and Johnston would introduce the Mundt-Nixon-Fergusan legislation (S. 
1194, S. 1196, and H.R. 3342) on July 22, 1949 as S. 2311.3 The 
alarming provisions of H.R. 5852, according to Spingarn, had been the 
requirements that the Ccmnunist Party and its front organizations 
register with the Justice Department lists of their officers and report 
en the source and expenditure of their funds. Truman's assistant 
should not have been surprised at the extremism of the bills, since 
another administration figure, Attorney General Tan Clark, had asked 
Congress in February of 1948 to tighten existing laws to curb 
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subversive activities. Clark endorsed the Mundt bill's principle of 
disclosure and suggested strengthening the Voorhis Act, which required 
the registration of foreign-controlled organizations with the Attorney 
General, by making an organization's officers responsible for the 
group's compliance with the act. Clark further added that, while the 
proposed changes would strengthen his hand, they "might not do the 
complete job." Clark added even more fuel to the fire by asserting his 
opinion that in the event of war with the Soviet Union the American 
4 Ccmnunist Party would not be loyal. The provisions Clark requested 
would becxme seme of the foundations of the McCarran Act in September 
of 1950, by which time Clark would be sitting on the Supreme Court. 
As liberals saw it, H.R. 5852 was unconstitutional. Section 1 of 
the bill described Ccmnunism and its aim to establish a totalitarian 
dictatorship in countries around the world. Section 3 required 
Carnrunist organizations to register with the Attorney General, listing 
the names of all their members. Section 4 made it a crime, punishable 
by up to ten years in jail and a $10,000 fine, to act in any manner 
with intent to establish a totalitarian dictatorship under Ccmnunist 
control in the United States. Members of the Ccmnunist Party in the 
United States would be punished if they registered and they would be 
punished if they did not, thereby violating a suspect's Fifth Amendment 
right against self-incrimination. By proscribing acting "in any manner 
with intent to establish a totalitarian dictatorship," the Mundt bill, 
in effect, made it illegal to advocate the same views as Ccmnunists. 
The effect of this, in the view of the liberal watchgroup, Americans 
for Democratic Action, would be to limit freedom of speech and 
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association and make liberal causes suspect. The AOLU argued that the 
legislation also violated the clauses of the Sixth Amendment which 
guarantee the accused the rights to a jury trial and to confront 
witnesses. The determination of which organizations were to ccme under 
the scrutiny of the law would be left up to a Subversive Activities 
Ccnmissicn and not the courts. Given that power, the government would 
need only show that the group had failed to register in order to obtain 
a guilty verdict. Although the organizations had the right to a trial 
for violating the law, they had no such trial to determine the validity 
of their listing in the first place. Furthermore, said the ACLU, the 
method of determining guilt by legislative proscription rather than by 
judicial trial, as S. 1194, S.1196, and H.R. 5852 sought . to do, 
constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder.® 
Liberal activists reacted to the threat to civil liberties with 
vigor. In the 1948 presidential campaign, supporters of Henry Wallace, 
former Vice President under Franklin Roosevelt, formed "The Ccranittee 
to Defeat the Mundt Bill" and planned a 5,000-delegate march can 
Washington to protest the legislation. The National Wallace 
Organization, along with the Civil Rights Congress and the 
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, among others, 
chartered planes and trains from across the nation in an effort to 
7 
fight the bill and install their man in the White House. Truman, in 
September of 1948, claimed that Wallace's third party candidacy was the 
vehicle by which Ccmnunists were helping the Republicans in the 
Q 
election. By asserting that his administration was tougher on 
Ccmnunists than the Republicans, the President revealed his disregard 
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for liberal opinion and demonstrated how the conflicting pressures of 
political competition could influence his position on civil liberties. 
Opposition to repressive legislation did not come solely from 
liberal groups, however. Russell H. Fluent, a veteran of World War I 
and chairman of the "Veterans Committee Against the Mundt-Nixcn Bill," 
claimed that "no administration in temporary power has the completely 
un-American 1 right' to declare people or organizations 'subversive' 
9 
just because they disagree with the administration." Opponents of H.R. 
5852 and its repressive provisions were both vocal and numerous well 
before Pat McCarran would attach his name to the proposals offered by 
Mundt, Nixon, Ferguson, Johnston, and others. 
Events of late 1948 moved the debate over internal security 
legislation to the right, and the President, ever concerned about 
maintaining his political viability, went with the flow. Truman 
narrowly won the race for the Presidency in November, and on December 
15 a former employee of the State Department named Alger Hiss was 
indicted for spying. The Hiss case combined with a heated political 
atmosphere to encourage legislative repression. According to the New 
York Times, in April 1949 Senator Pat McCarran (D-NV) proposed 
strengthening immigration and espionage laws to protect the United 
States in what he said was "the black era of fifth column infiltration 
and cold war with the ruthless masters of the Kremlin.""^ In August, 
the press reported that the President, unwilling in the face of public 
scrutiny to combat such rhetoric, had succumbed and given the Justice 
Department the exclusive power to bar from entry into the United 
States, without public hearings, any aliens which the department 
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considered dangerous.11 
Other significant developments in 1949 included the reintroduction 
of the Mundt-Nixan-Fergusan legislation of 1948 with a revision of the 
section which outlawed acting "in any manner" with intent to establish 
a totalitarian dictatorship in the United States. Responding to 
criticisms of "thought control," the legislators changed the wording to 
prohibit the knowing commission of an "act which would substantially 
contribute" to the establishment of a dictatorship. This concession 
was minor in the face of the fact that both measures barred Connunists 
12 
from federally appointed jobs and from holding passports. In July 
1949, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee approved for consideration the 
Mundt-Ferguson-Johnstan measure. Ihis legislation included a revision 
extending the statute of limitations front three to ten years, which 
Attorney General Clark had requested. This proposal also required the 
registration of Ccmnunists. 
The wording of the internal security legislation introduced in 
1948 and 1949 set no limits on the type of organizations which would 
came under scrutiny. An unscrupulous demagogue might construe the 
definition of Ccmnunist front to include anything — chambers of 
commerce, labor unions, even farm groups. In fact, it would be up to 
those who held political power to define who were the enemies of the 
state. In the conservative post-war period, liberals knew, those 
13 
favoring New Deal-type reforms might very well come under attack. A 
good exanple of this fear was Mary T. Norton's (D-New Jersey) response 
to H.R. 5852. She complained that "no person can read this bill and not 
realize that it is directed against labor." Norton noted a broader 
29 
concern with the bill when she quoted Reman Catholic bishop Francis J. 
Haas as saying that the bill was "potentially destructive of the moral 
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and civil rights of all Americans." Henry Wallace remarked that the 
real victim of the Mundt bill would not be Ccmnunism but democracy, 
because, in his words, "Mundt and Nixon are more interested in devising 
legislation to intimidate liberals than they are in putting Ccmnunists 
in jail."1̂  
The administration's public response to the various repressive 
proposals was one of outrage. The President in 1948 had declared his 
opposition to legislation, such as Mundt-Nixon, which would outlaw 
political parties. "I never make comments on bills that are pending 
until they come before me," he said in a May 1948 press conference, 
"but as to outlawing political parties in the United States, I think 
that is entirely contrary to our principles."1® 
The President was not alone in his opinion. In a letter to 
Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, in June of 
1948, Attorney General Tcm Clark pointed out some constitutional 
problems posed by H.R. 5852. Section 2 of the bill, he stated, defined 
Ccmnunism as a foreign-controlled effort to establish a totalitarian 
dictatorship in the United States. He argued that section 8 of the bill 
required that organizations designated as Ccmnunist which failed to 
register with the Attorney General be severely punished, while those 
who complied with section 8 found themselves liable for the penalties 
of section 4, which imposed a ten-year prison sentence for anyone 
participating in a movement to establish a foreign-controlled 
totalitarian dictatorship in the United States. Clark suggested that 
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H.R. 5852 might be held to deny First Amendment freedoms of speech, the 
press, and assembly. The measure, Clark argued, also violated the 
Fifth Amendment's right of the accused to due process by defining the 
nature and purposes of an organization or group via legislative fiat. 
Clark also claimed that the disclosure provisions of the Mundt bill 
compelled the Ccmnunists to incriminate themselves, violating yet 
another clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General went on to 
say that outlawing the Ccmnunist Party was not only unconstitutional, 
but ineffective as well. Ccmnunists, he claimed, would just be driven 
to deny their affiliations, thereby making prosecutions of Ccmnunists 
more difficult. Also, he argued, the bill would mate "martyrs" of 
17 Ccmnunists and their sympathizers. The Attorney General did not 
attempt to reconcile his earlier request for tougher legislation with 
the obvious constitutional problems which such a request was bound to 
engender. The executive and legislative branches, it seems, were 
playing hot potato with the controversial issue of internal security 
legislation. 
The above positions of the administration, adopted in 1948, were 
important because they illuminated a consistent thread of arguments 
which the administration would make for the next two years. The 
rhetoric of the White House consistently emphasized that repressive 
internal security legislation threatened not only the Constitution but 
also the effectiveness of investigative and law enforcement 
techniques. This dual approach allowed the administration to avoid 
unpopular policies while appealing to the wide center of the American 
political spectrum. While officials would make these arguments again 
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and again, the pressure to tighten internal security legislation would 
remain constant also. To understand the true position of the Truman 
administration concerning such issues, however, one must take into 
consideration the practices of the administration as well as its 
rhetoric. 
In 1948, H.R. 5852 passed the House by a vote of 319 to 58, 
illustrating strong anti-ocrmiunist feelings in Congress well before the 
McCarran debate. In March of 1949, Francis Walter, a Democrat from 
Pennsylvania, offered a draconian amendment to the Nationality Act of 
1940 which would penalize members of a Ccmnunist political party with 
18 
loss of citizenship. Another piece of drastic legislation introduced 
in 1949 was the Hobbs bill (H.R. 10), sponsored by the Justice 
Department. Introduced initially by Sam Hobbs (D-AL), the bill provided 
for the lifetime detention of aliens suspected of being subversive. 
While the language of the bill did not explicitly denote permanent 
incarceration, it did give the government the pcwer to detain 
indefinitely aliens who, upcn deportation, were rejected by their 
native countries. In May, the ADA and the ACLU issued a statement 
condemning H.R. 10, claiming that the bill inquired into the beliefs of 
aliens by requiring the alien "to give information under oath as to his 
circumstances, habits, associations, and activities." No provision, 
19 
they argued, was made for protection against self-incrimination. The 
Nation opposed the Hobbs bill on different grounds. Calling it a 
"concentration-camp measure," the liberal magazine argued that the bill 
was unnecessary because the general criminal code already covered 
20 
specific "criminal or subversive" acts. 
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The Truman administration also opposed the Hobbs bill, but the 
manner in which it handled the bill revealed the ambivalence with which 
the White House approached the issue of civil liberties. In May 1950 
Stephen Spingarn notified the new Attorney General, J. Howard McGrath, 
that the Justice Department was supporting a bill that the President 
had recently cxxne to oppose. That same month, the President sent a 
memo to McGrath requiring that Justice take the rights of the 
individual, as well as national security, into account when 
scrutinizing new proposals. The President made this reccnmendation 
after receiving a memo from Spingarn which proposed that the 
administration should approve only those bills that struck "the best 
possible balance" between national security and civil liberties 
21 considerations. The administration did not adept the argument of the 
Nation which implied that there was in fact no need for compromise. 
Hie concept of balance, which the administration would use again in its 
fights with Congress, betrayed a willingness to compromise on the part 
of the White House when it came to preserving civil liberties. Indeed, 
given the President's surrender on the issue of alien detention in 
1949, the balance sought was not so much one between liberty and 
security as one among liberty, security, and political expediency. 
Hiis consideration had the effect of tipping the balance toward 
security. 
Hie suspicion that the Truman administration was willing to 
compromise on the issue of civil liberties in order to maintain the 
President's political strength was borne out by the debate surrounding 
yet more proposed legislation in Congress. A major bill under review in 
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1949 and 1950 was S. 2311, ccmnonly kncwn as the 
Mundt-Ferguson-Johnstcjn bill. This bill possessed the main features of 
earlier bills, which required the Ccmnunist Party to register 
membership lists and donor information with the Attorney General, and 
to label all mailings as being disseminated by a Ccmnunist 
organization. S. 2311 also barred Ccmnunists frcm holding federal 
offices or obtaining passports. In addition to imposing a 10-year 
prison sentence for convicted subversives, the bill revised the statute 
of limitations for stealing documents frcm ten years to an unlimited 
period, as requested by Attorney General Ton Clark. This revision was 
in response to the Hiss case. Concerning the registration of Ccmnunist 
organization membership lists, S. 2311 stipulated that the Attorney 
General notify everyone on those lists. Anyone who formally denied 
membership could appeal his or her case to the government's Subversive 
Activities Control Board after a full FBI check cn his or her 
activities. 
Before noting the administration's handling of legislation such as 
S. 2311, one must understand the pressure that existed in Congress and 
the American public to tighten internal security. Hie Ccmnunist 
victory in China in 1949 and the successful Soviet test of atomic 
weaponry in the same year increased American anxiety and fear. 
Suspicion of subversives at home, fueled in part by policies, such as 
the loyalty program, of the Truman administration, translated into a 
suspicion of liberal programs and personalities, such as the people and 
programs commonly associated with the New Deal. Oner son Schmidt, 
director of Economic Research for the U.S. Chamber of Ccmneroe, 
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expressed this fear accurately when he stated before the House 
Un-American Activities Ccrmittee that "democratic socialism may be a 
mere prelude to Canttunisni." Schmidt supported his claim with the 
argument that, in the 1930's, the Agriculture Department (headed by 
Vfellace) moved toward socialism more than any other phase of the New 
Deal, and more Ccnmunists and people "accused of such" came frcm 
22 
there. Many conservatives in Congress shared Schmidt's beliefs. In 
May of 1950, thirty-two proposed bills related to internal security 
23 
appeared in the combined dockets of the House and Senate. 
The Truman administration, and civil libertarians, initially 
responded to the security bills frcm positions which reflected concern 
for individual rights. Whereas the rights activists maintained their 
vigilant opposition to internal security legislation, the White House 
waffled on its ccnrnitment to civil liberties in an attempt to retain 
its political strength. 
In the case of S. 2311, or the Subversive Activities Control Act 
as it was commonly known, the administration presented powerful 
arguments apposing its enactment. In a letter to Pat McCarran, 
chairman of the Senate Judiciary Ccmnittee, Assistant Attorney General 
Peyton Ford claimed that S. 2311 might be found to be unconstitutional, 
and would at the very least make martyrs of convicted Communists. 
Noting the 1949 conviction of eleven Ccmnunists in New York and their 
pending appeals, Ford emphasized a 1948 letter from Tcm Clark to the 
previous chairman of the Senate Judiciary Ccrmittee, Alexander Wiley, 
concerning identical legislation (the Mundt bill) in which Clark cited 
the Supreme Court's opinion in W. Virginia v. Barnette that stated 
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simply, "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe 
what shall be orthodox in politics.. .or force citizens to confess by 
24 
word or act their faith therein." Ford's letter illustrated an 
apparently strong regard for civil liberties on the part of the 
admini stratian. 
The ACLU and other civil libertarians joined the White House in 
its attack on S. 2311. In March 1950, the ACLU released a statement 
sounding the by then familiar opposition to proposals such as S. 2311. 
Making sure to proclaim its "complete and unalterable" opposition to 
Ccmnunism, the ACLU went on to criticize the vague language of the 
bill. The ACLU asked if publishing Marxist literature would 
"substantially contribute to the establishment of a totalitarian 
dictatorship." The Union also wondered whether an attorney who 
defended a Ccmnunist in a political case would be guilty under this 
section. The ACLU repeated the claim that the registration provisions 
of the bill constituted an unconstitutional bill of attainder by 
imposing penalties through legislation rather than through judicial 
trial. The ACLU also argued that the provision providing that the 
unrestricted determination of the Subversive Activities Control Board 
as to which organizations were to be prosecuted would be final, 
violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantees of trial by jury and the 
25 
right to confront witnesses. Others assaulted the repressive aspects 
of S. 2311 as well. A statement dated March 31 1950 and signed by 
eighteen organizatians, among them the American Jewish Congress, the 
Textile Workers Union of America, and the American Council for Human 
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Rights, claimed that S. 2311 threatened the organizational activity of 
the entire liberal movement in the United States. Wondering where the 
repression would end, the statement quoted Guy Gabrielsan, Republican 
National Chairman, who said that the Socialists would be next after the 
Connunists. "We haven't gotten around to them yet," he said, "but I 
premise you we will. Avowed Socialists have no more place in the 
official family of the President of the United States than have 
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Ccmnunists...Socialism is just the first step toward Ccmnunism." 
Seven months earlier, the New Republic prophetically revealed how this 
would be done. S. 2311, the magazine argued, provided for the 
Presidential Ceranission to determine a group to be subversive merely by 
the group's failing to turn over its records. Another kind of evidence 
the Caimission could use would be the kinds of people who were active 
27 
in the organization, and the people with whcm they associated. 
Despite arguments against its passage, the Senate Judiciary 
Ccmmittee reported out the bill with a ten to one vote. The lane 
dissenter, interestingly, was a Republican, William Langer of North 
Dakota. In a passionate defense of civil liberties, he claimed, "It is 
proposed to regiment the thinking of the American people...it is 
proposed to confer on a politically appointed board vague and, 
28 
therefore, unrestricted power to outlaw associations." The Nation 
responded to the Ccmmittee's move in a like manner, arguing that if the 
bill were to beccme law, "we will have invited a future Administration 
to outlaw, by the same device, whatever party or group it may find 
29 
inconvenient to its purposes." 
Had the administration chosen to do so, it would have had plenty 
37 
of solid arguments upon which to base a stand in favor of individual 
rights. Yet the White House retreated from its earlier hard-line 
opposition to S. 2311 in favor of a more politically neutral position. 
Charles Murphy and Stephen Spingarn suggested to the President that 
executive policy regarding internal security legislation should attempt 
to achieve "the best possible balance" between national security and 
30 
individual rights. Spingarn defended this strategy years after the 
crises of 1950 had subsided. In a 1967 interview he reiterated his 
position cn civil liberties, claiming that "every time you exercise 
internal security you are infringing cn individual rights, and there 
has to be a balance here between the national interest and the personal 
interest at sane point.... Hie difficult thing is to strike a balance 
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between the two, and this will not always be the same balance." 
Hie idea of balance, and the malleability of this balance, posed a 
threat to the stability of civil liberties in the United States. The 
strategy of balance left the fate of individual rights up to the 
political currents of the times. Truman sought a defensible stand with 
regard to civil liberties but defined his position with respect to the 
hard-line anti-ccranunists in Congress rather than with respect to the 
Constitution. In spite of the President's sometimes stirring rhetoric, 
his actions lagged behind. "Excessive security," Truman wrote in a May 
1950 memo to McGrath, "encroaches cn the individual rights and freedoms 
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which distinguish a democracy from a totalitarian country." Yet this 
seemingly powerful statement in defense of individual freedoms had no 
teeth. The President left approval of internal security legislation up 
to the Attorney General's decision that a "balance has been struck" 
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between internal security and civil liberties. The Attorney General 
received no clear directive concerning the President's wishes on this 
matter, aside frcm the request that the Justice Department's Civil 
Rights Section become more involved in evaluations of internal security 
legislation. 
Hie Truman administration continued to maintain an undefined 
position toward civil liberties as sunmer approached. The President 
received a memo frcm his administrative assistant, George Elsey, 
encouraging Truman to propose a ocumission on internal security and 
individual rights. Truman's assistants had brought up the idea far 
such a caimission before as a way to determine in a bipartisan manner 
the role of civil liberties in matters of internal security. Elsey 
made the nature of the administration's strategy clear. "Seme such 
step as this is necessary," Elsey said, referring to the ccmnissicn, 
"to offset the serious consequences of the irresponsible attacks which 
Republicans are making against the Government." Hie attacks, he said, 
"give rise to a public hysteria.. .increase the likelihood of repressive 
legislation.. .shake the confidence of people in this country in their 
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Government." By defining the problem as a congressional, Republican 
matter, Elsey and others in the White House ignored the executive 
branch's own complicity in the rise of "public hysteria." Hie negative 
effect of the loyalty program on the public's confidence in the 
government notwithstanding, the unwillingness on the part of the Truman 
administration to take a positive stand on civil liberties also 
contributed to a repressive atmosphere. 
Hie proposed Caimission on Internal Security and Individual 
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Rights, often touted as a defense of civil liberties, also exhibited 
the political nature of the debate over internal security. David Bell, 
another Truman assistant, pointed out that Senator McCarran had 
appointed a subcommittee June 1 to address the same issues which the 
Presidential ccmmission would examine. Bell argued that the 
administration should establish a caimission before Congress did, in 
order to "take the spotlight and the ball." That way, he claimed, the 
White House could direct the discussion on internal security and 
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individual rights, stealing thunder from the Mundt-Nixon bill. Bell 
readily admitted the partisan nature of his strategy, but offered no 
positive course for the administration to take concerning civil 
liberties. 
The events of 1949 and 1950 illustrated the great support for 
repressive internal security legislation. There also existed a 
consistent, powerful opposition to these laws on the part of liberals 
and others. The inconsistent political force during this period was 
the administration of President Harry Truman. The President and his 
assistants continued to see the debate in political terms. Perhaps 
predictably, they made their position contingent on the mood in 
Congress and the public. In doing so, however, they contributed to the 
erosion of individual rights. The commencement of hostilities in Korea 
on June 25, 1950, marked the beginnings of further trouble for civil 
liberties in the United States, as the nation geared up for a hot war 
with Communism. Hie Truman administration, under pressure to wage this 
war at home as well as abroad, found itself wedged between over zealous, 
repressive legislation on one hand and fundamental American liberties 
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on the other. The White House had itself as well as others to blame 
for the discomfort. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Korean conflict encouraged even greater anti-ccrrinunist 
sentiment in the United States than had existed previously, and the 
response of the Truman administration reflected the equivocation with 
which the President and his aides approached the heightened threat to 
civil liberties. While Truman initially won favor with his prosecution 
of the war, hard-line anti-Ccmnunists in Congress quickly regained the 
advantage, and public sentiment rose to a fever pitch. In July, 1950, 
67 percent of the respondents to a Gallup poll supported the 
registration of Ccmnunist Party members. Ninety percent of those 
polled favored the removal of Ccmnunists frcm important war 
industries. And 85 percent of those polled favored, in the event of 
war with the Soviet Unicn, either the registration, iirprisonment, 
deportation, or execution of Ccmnunist Party members. Only one percent 
said nothing should be done because "everyone is entitled to freedom of 
thought.""'" The supercharged political atmosphere, fueled by the coming 
elections, accelerated the passage of drastic security measures. Hie 
war provided the climate for hysteria to dominate the election 
campaigns, and the demagogue Joseph McCarthy struck a hard blew when he 
charged that the State Department had sabotaged funds earmarked for the 
South Korean army, thereby necessitating American intervention. 
According to McCarthy, only $52,000 of $112,900,000 in military aid 
2 
actually made it to the South Korean military. 
Private persons also struck out at the perceived Ccmnunist 
threat. Sponsors of a speech Owen Lattimore planned to give at a New 
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Hampshire hotel cancelled his engagement because, in the words of one 
person involved, "anyone about whan there is any question should not be 
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allowed to speak." Professor Lattimore had previously cane under heavy 
fire frcm the House Un-American Activities Carmittee, and more recently 
from Joe McCarthy, who claimed that Lattimore was the Kremlin's top 
agent in the State Department. His sponsors cancelled Lattimore's 
speech despite the fact that a Senate subcommittee had completely 
cleared him of all charges, calling McCarthy's charges a "fraud and a 
hoax." Lattimore's trouble illustrated not only the repressive impact 
of the Korean War, but also the effectiveness of the red-hunters' 
ability to injure their enemies with publicity. The subcommittee's 
exoneration of Lattimore never caught up to the initial accusations or 
the press's questioning of the professor's innocence. 
The Truman administration found itself once again in the situation 
of having to fight Ccmnunism while offering the public a political 
alternative to Congressional opponents. The course of events frcm June 
to September of 1950 revealed that the administration, under daunting 
pressure, could not or would not put civil liberties on an equal 
footing with political strategy. At the very least, it would be 
accurate to say that the administration's battle with Congressional 
anti-Ccmnunists assumed such proportions, and such a degree of 
partisanship, that the administration's efforts on behalf of civil 
liberties were indistinguishable from its efforts to maintain political 
strength. 
The Korean conflict gave new hope to proponents of the Mundt-Nixcn 
legislation and presented new problems for the Truman administration in 
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the area of internal security. In June, Pat McCarran appointed a 
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, with Senator Warren Magnusan as its 
chairman, to draft internal security legislation. Magnusan wanted to 
introduce a bill, as a counter to the Mundt-Nixon bill, which would 
give the President broad powers to arrest and detain any individual 
known to be a member of an organization advocating the forceful 
overthrow of the government. In order to implement this power, the 
President would be required to determine that a disturbance threatened 
international relations and declare a national emergency. Ihen, the 
President would have to obtain the consent of both houses of Congress. 
After which, the President could implement the detention of 
"subversives." 
Truman's effort to garner the support of a public bent on 
repression reflected not cnly the administration's preoccupation with 
politics rather than civil liberties, but also the extent to which the 
administration shared its opponents' assumptions about the Caimsunist 
threat and the proper way to respond. In a memo en July 12, Stephen 
Spingam argued that Magnuscn's proposal was worse than the Mundt-Nixcn 
bill and would anger most of the liberals in the country. Spingarn 
then suggested that an effective counter-proposal to Mundt-Nixon would 
be to require all political organizations "to make public the sources 
4 of their funds, how they disburse them, and who their officers are." 
In response to the mounting pressure to do something about internal 
security, Spingarn proposed broadening the pcwers of government 
supervision. "It is usually true," Spingarn ocnmented, in a telling 
statement about the administration's regard for individual rights, 
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"that you can't lick something with nothing." Spingarn's attitude 
revealed his willingness to accept restrictions on civil liberties in 
order to win a political battle, and also revealed that he shared basic 
assumptions with his enemies en the right concerning the comparative 
value of civil liberties and internal security. 
July 1950 saw a flurry of legislative activity and administration 
responses. On July 12, the House passed H.R. 7439, a bill which 
provided for the summary suspension of federal enployees determined to 
be a security risk by the heads of government agencies. The bill 
authorized an agency head to dismiss an employee "as he deems 
necessary." The employee would receive the charges against him in 
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writing, but only "as specifically as security considerations permit." 
Although many Truman supporters vehemently opposed such legislation, 
they failed to recognize that the President's loyalty program contained 
virtually the same provision. The Nation pointed out that, under the 
bill, "any government employee may be made the victim of personal 
animosity and may be accused, prosecuted, and convicted by a single 
official."** Such hasty and ill-considered legislation soon became 
cannon in Congress. 
The President also had trouble controlling the enthusiasm of the 
Justice Department for chasing Communists. This was especially true 
when Tcm Clark headed the Department, but problems continued to plague 
the President, even after the appointment of a new Attorney General, J. 
Howard McGrath. Without a clear mandate from the President outlining 
the administration's stand on civil liberties, the Justice Department 
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continued to pursue "law and order" with relatively unfettered vigor. 
Hie Justice Department had sponsored an internal security bill, H.R. 
4703, in 1947. The measure underwent substantial revision over the next 
several years, due to objections concerning seme overly repressive 
sections raised by the Treasury Department, which reviewed all bills 
under consideration as part of the Bureau of the Budget's role in the 
legislative process. The major sections of H.R. 4703 provided for a 
tightening of the Espionage Act of 1917 (extending the statute of 
limitations) and the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (the new 
provisions required all those with knowledge of foreign espionage 
tactics to register). The bill also allowed for the Secretary of 
Defense and the President, in a time of national emergency, to mate any 
regulation protecting any property they deemed to be in the interest of 
national security. The House passed the bill in March 1950, and, by 
mid-July, its companion bill, S. 595, awaited debate in the Senate. 
Stephen Spingarn suggested that Truman lend his approval to the 
bill. Spingarn argued that the bill had been substantially improved 
over its original provisions and, most important, would serve as an 
answer to the Mundt-Nixon bill then under consideration. "I have been 
influenced to seme extent in this judgment," Spingarn said, "by the 
fact that the current version of the Mundt-Nixon bill has been gaining 
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great strength en the Hill since the Korean situation broke." He also 
took the opportunity to reocnmend that S. 595 adopt his notion for 
9 
registering all "subversive organizations" instead of just Ccmnunists. 
Once again Spingarn reacted to the pressure for repression with a bill 
only somewhat less overtly repressive than the bill Congress had 
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Hie battle over internal security continued to escalate throughout 
July and August. As Congress rode a wave of public support for 
crackdowns en Ccmnunists, the administration fought a rearguard action 
which, while clearly more protective of civil liberties than Congress, 
nevertheless revealed that the White House was unwilling to risk public 
support in order to preserve basic freedoms. The conflict between 
Congress and the Truman administration centered on the 
Mundt-Ferguson-Johnstan legislation, S. 2311. The registration and 
disclosure provisions of the bill were distasteful to the President and 
offered the means by which the White House could differentiate itself 
from its opponents in Congress. With his back to the wall, Truman 
appeared finally to acme down on the side of civil liberties. He 
boldly declared in a July 22 conference that he would veto any 
legislation that violated the Bill of Rights, regardless of the fact 
that it would be an unpopular move in an election year.^ Truman hoped 
to have it all ways. He portrayed himself as a defender of civil 
liberties and his opponents as violators of the Constitution. At the 
same time he set himself up as the true defender of internal security 
and his opponents as obstructionists. 
Spingarn's report on S. 2311 detailed its constitutional and 
practical shortcomings. The bill, he noted, contained a significant 
revision of its predecessor, the Mundt-Nixon bill. Instead of directly 
outlawing the Cancnunist Party, S. 2311 required proof that a suspect be 
found to have conspired to perform an "act which would substantially 
contribute to the establishment within the United States of a 
totalitarian dictatorship" and that a foreign entity controlled that 
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effort. Spingarn argued that if the Smith Act of 1940, which required 
only that the prosecution prove that a subversive entity advocated or 
taught the violent overthrew of American government, were held to be 
valid by the courts, then the new bill, much harder to enforce, was 
unnecessary and cumbersome. Experience, he said, indicated that frati 
two to three years of bureaucratic and legal procedure would elapse 
before the Subversive Activities Control Board could require any group 
to register. And given the secrecy and mendacity of Ccmnunist 
organizations, one could count on their refusal to register. In short, 
the bill would contribute nothing to internal security. 
Spingarn also attacked the constitutionality of S. 2311. Hie 
phrase "substantially contribute" was vague, he argued, and lent itself 
to being construed as prohibiting legal action which sought drastically 
to change the government, such as a constitutional amendment. This 
prohibition, he claimed, made the bill void on its face. The 
President's special assistant also brought up the old argument that the 
registration provision of the bill, requiring that Ccmnunists who were 
not on the Attorney General1 s formal list register themselves, violated 
the Fifth Amendment's command that "no person shall be canpelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself." Finally, Spingarn 
mentioned the possibility that the proposed legislation constituted 
prior restraint by providing that the simple fact of party membership 
and not any physical behavior constituted a crime."''''' 
To Spingarn's credit, seme of his remarks, though tempered by his 
emphasis an the practical difficulties of the bill, did defend the 
principle of civil liberties. But they also reflect Spingarn's 
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assumption that certain forms of restrictions were legitimate, most 
notably the Attorney General's power to determine who would and who 
would not be compelled "to be a witness against himself." 
Even as Spingarn wrote, times continued to get worse. As if 
existing pressure to pass S. 2311 were not enough, American forces in 
Korea suffered setback after setback and, by the end of July, found 
themselves packed into a small area surrounding Pusan at the tip of the 
Korean peninsula. Senator Mundt had told reporters earlier in the 
month that "the climate is certainly conducive for Congressional 
passage of this (S. 2311) right now. If we are asking our boys to die 
fighting in Korea and other areas, we certainly should protect them 
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from sabotage behind their backs here at heme." As the situation on 
the battlefield worsened, the impulse for repression at heme became 
more severe. Indeed, as the Senate approached the Mundt bill toward 
the end of July, the New York Times reflected on the gravity of the 
situation. "Hie English-speaking world in all its perils," contented 
the newspaper, "has not in modern history done quite what is now 
13 proposed to be done." 
Hie White House was sensitive to pressures frcm Congress and the 
public. Presidential assistant David Lloyd sounded the alarm with a 
memo to Charles Murphy in which he noted that Freedom House, an 
organization of prominent liberals, favored outlawing the Ccmnunist 
Party. Hiis, he claimed, was a "very significant trend of public 
14 opinion." Hie President responded to that significant trend on August 
8, with an internal security message to Congress. Hie thrust of the 
President's message asserted that current laws were strong enough to 
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ocmbat Ccmnunist subversion, and that, as they sought to defeat 
Ccmnunist subversion, the American people should, at the same time, 
safeguard civil liberties. Truman found support for his claim that 
existing laws sufficed fran a recent federal appeals court decision of 
August 1 which upheld the conviction of eleven Ccmnunist Party members 
under the Smith Act of 1940. Judge Learned Hand supported the 
prosecution's contention that the Ccmnunist Party represented a "clear 
15 
and present danger" to the United States. 
In his message, the President pointed to the many strong laws 
already on the books. He cited the Smith Act as well as laws against 
treason, espionage, and sabotage. Tinman also noted immigration and 
naturalization laws. And, lastly, he cited his own loyalty program as 
an effective preventive measure. The President acknowledged the need 
for strong new legislation in the areas of espionage (extending the 
statute of limitations beyond three years) and alien deportation. He 
took the time to criticize the Hobbs bill, H.R. 10, and offered in its 
place a measure authorizing the Attorney General to exercise 
supervision over deportable aliens by requiring them to report their 
whereabouts, instead of detaining them indefinitely, as the Hobbs bill 
required. 
Truman went on to attack the Mundt legislation then pending in 
Congress. "This kind of proposed legislation is dangerous," he said, 
"because, in attempting to proscribe, for groups such as the 
ocmnunists, certain activities that are perfectly proper for everyone 
else, such legislation would spread a legal dragnet sufficiently broad 
to permit the prosecution of people who are entirely innocent or merely 
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misguided." The President also argued that the legislation would 
simply drive the Carmunists underground and, if the legislation were 
held unconstitutional, make martyrs of them.1*' 
Truman's message made it appear that the White House was at last 
taking a positive stand on the issue of civil liberties, defining its 
position on relevant proposals, and striking its own course. Many 
newspapers applauded the President's courage. The Chicago Sun Times 
called Truman an ail-American, "on the first team with Washington, 
17 
Madison, and Jefferson." Hie ADA sent a telegram to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee in support of Truman's suggestions and urged 
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Americans to follow his lead in opposing repressive legislation. Hie 
New Republic, however, observed that the President's message had been 
"pounced upon by every faction in Congress as confirmation of its own 
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original opinion." Hard-core anti-Ccmnunists focused on the 
President's call for tougher legislation, while liberals focused on 
Truman's assault on the Mundt-Nixon legislation and his defense of 
existing laws. By failing clearly to establish an unequivocal stand on 
civil liberties, the President actually contributed to the 
anti-Ccmnunist hysteria. This failure indicated not so much that the 
President was overtly hostile to the Constitution, but rather that he 
deemed the political stakes too high to risk a strong position in 
support of unpopular principles. 
The actual course that the Truman administration took in its fight 
against the Mundt legislation revealed that the administration's focus 
still fell short of a constitutional defense of civil liberties. On 
August 17 a group of ten Senators, including Estes Kefauver, Hubert 
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Humphrey, Warren Magnuson and Soott Lucas, intrcduoed a bill which 
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embodied the President's reccmnendaticns of August 8. The bill, S. 
4061, fell prey to McCarran's Judiciary Ccnmittee, which cn the same 
day reported S. 4037, McCarran's annibus internal security bill. These 
two bills represented the respective positions which the White House 
and Congress took on the issue of internal security legislation. 
McCarran's bill eventually combined with a House measure, H.R. 9490, to 
become the Internal Security Act of 1950. 
Hie McCarran bill contained a number of anti-subversive 
provisions, gleaned from previous proposals in Congress. It contained 
the registration and publication provisions of S. 2311, McCarran's own 
reccmmendaticns authorizing the Justice Department to bar or deport a 
large number of aliens, S. 595's anti-espionage sections, H.R. 10's 
detention provisions, and a new effort to establish a new bureau of 
21 passports and visas. Hie various approaches of Congressional 
hard-liners had gelled under the direction of Pat McCarran. 
Hie White House reacted swiftly to the political threat posed by 
S. 4037, but continued to accord a lew priority to the larger threat to 
individual rights. The new "blockbuster" bill amended a 1918 law, 
which provided for the exclusion and deportation of "subversive" 
aliens, to exclude also affiliates of the American Ccmnunist Party and 
its organizations. A White House memo argued that the phrase 
"totalitarian party" went undefined, and would thus lead to 
administrative difficulties. Furthermore, such warding might not have 
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exempted officials fran foreign governments or the United Nations. 
Hie extent to which the administration shared the approach of the right 
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became apparent as the White House developed arguments against the 
McCarran bill. The administration focused an the deficiencies in the 
bill aanpared to the President's own anti-communist efforts — not an a 
defense of civil liberties. A catmunique by Peyton Ford, the Assistant 
Attorney General, argued that the nationality provisions of S. 4037 
(those determining which type of alien the United States would admit 
for citizenship), which amended the Nationality Act of 1940 to exclude 
Communists, were confusing and administratively deficient. 
Stipulations regarding membership in banned organizations could be 
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circumvented, he charged. Ford made no mention of possible violations 
of rights in his memo. The executive branch's concern for civil 
liberties during this period, when expressed, was less than 
enthusiastic. 
From the administration's awn perspective, its alternative bill, 
S. 4061, took a more "rational" approach to security legislation. 
Based upon the President's reoaimendaticns as embodied in his message 
of August 8, the bill implied that the Smith Act and the Nationality 
Act needed no changes, while the Inmigration and Foreign Agents 
Registration Acts needed strengthening. Hie administration's proposal 
extended the statute of limitations for espionage frcrti three to ten 
years, and required those with knowledge of foreign espionage tactics 
to register with the Attorney General. Hie bill also substituted the 
Hobbs bill's permanent detention provision (included in S. 4037) with a 
parole-like provision that required deportable aliens to report their 
whereabouts. 
S. 4061 sought to accomplish two things. It intended to compete 
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with the popularity of the McCarran bill's anti-Carmunist position 
while at the same time preserving the President's image as a defender 
24 
of civil liberties. In attempting to accomplish this, the 
administration's bill fell prey to the same complications which the 
administration's position created all along. Instead of presenting a 
position which emphasized civil liberties, Truman attempted to defeat 
McCarran by introducing a rival bill, which he argued was more 
effective. Furthermore, the President's rhetorical support for civil 
liberties and his vague concern with "undue" or "excessive" measures 
25 clashed with his arguments in favor of tightening controls. These 
arguments served to heighten fear and suspicion; if the Ccmnunist 
threat were as real as the Korean situation implied, and the President 
recognized that a comparable threat existed internally as well, then 
restrictive measures would not be unwise. The President, through his 
efforts to mitigate Congress' s proposals by meeting them half way, 
admitted either that his administration's efforts and existing laws had 
been ineffective, or that a genuine threat existed and that threat 
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justified drastic legislation. The administration's approach revealed 
Truman's equivocation concerning civil liberties. Moreover, Truman's 
strategy failed; it resulted in a general reduction in the political 
standing of the administration. The increasing conflict between the 
White House and congressional conservatives, Truman's weakening 
political position, and his desire to gain political advantage from the 
issue explained the course of events surrounding the veto of the 
McCarran Act. 
The White House and Congress jockeyed for position during the last 
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week of August and the first weeks of September. While the Truman 
administration found sane support for its proposals, the tide of battle 
definitely favored conservatives in Congress. As the President's 
position weakened, he found seme of his supporters in Congress 
abandoning civil liberties in favor of the more popular anti-Ccmnunist 
bandwagon. Campaign pressures on liberal legislators mounted, while 
the Justice Department held a more favorable view of the McCarran Act 
and its House counterpart, H.R. 9490, sponsored by John Wood, a 
Democrat fran Georgia and chairman of the House Un-American Activities 
Carmittee. 
However, the President was not entirely alone in his opposition to 
McCarran's proposals. A radio show, broadcast on August 21, 
interviewed Paul Jensen, a wartime counter-intelligence officer who 
vehemently opposed the Mundt-Fergusan and McCarran bills. While 
Jensen, an attorney at the time of the interview, noted the 
constitutional problems the bills created, his main attack centered 
around the impracticability of the bills' provisions. He predicted 
that, due to the registration requirements and the appeals provision, 
"it might be four or five years, or more, before any one agent is 
jailed." Jensen went cn to poke fun at the possibility of a Ccmnunist 
running to the Attorney General in order to get on the list. Jensen 
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favored as an alternative the administration bill, S. 4061. 
Hie interview with Jensen typified the kind of support the 
President received during this period. Influential figures, both 
public and private, concentrated their efforts on the ineffectiveness 
and, to a lesser extent, the unconstitutional nature of the 
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Congressional proposals. Administration accounts of news items 
emphasized the fact that "the active pendancy of this legislation has 
already caused the Ccmnunist Party to greatly accelerate its movement 
underground." The result of Wood's and McCarran's legislation, argued 
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the administration, would be a "serious blow" to internal security. 
The President's cwn position failed to focus on the constitutional 
weaknesses of the Wood-McCarran proposals, especially in the area of 
civil liberties. Spingarn commented that the outlook for the 
President's proposals was "very gloomy" and that the President 
29 desperately needed more public support. 
The Truman administration's lack of resolve and direction, 
accentuated by the increasing public hysteria, served only to further 
the destruction of support for moderate legislation within the 
President's own ranks. J. Howard McGrath, the President's Attorney 
General, actually supported parts of the McCarran bill. In a letter to 
Senator Lucas, who was ostensibly a Truman supporter, McGrath clarified 
the Justice Department' s views concerning the legislative proposals 
then under consideration. McGrath maintained the by then familiar 
objections to the registration provisions of the McCarran bill, 
emphasizing their ineffectiveness and impracticality. However, he 
argued for strengthening the anti-sabotage provisions of S. 4037 by 
giving the President the authority, as S. 595 did, to restrict access 
"to such property and places as the President may designate.. .in the 
interest of national security." 
The Attorney General brought the Justice Department's concern for 
effective, enforceable laws to the internal security debate, but the 
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manner in which he did so exposed a lack of concern for personal 
liberty, despite his occasional statements to the contrary. First, the 
provision granting the President restrictive powers raised some serious 
questions concerning due process, since the President was to receive 
complete power over personnel involved in areas concerning "national 
security," which could include virtually any circumstances. Second, 
McGrath1 s rhetoric revealed that, in spite of his defense of the 
Constitution, his foremost goal was to apprehend those deemed 
subversive. "Hie present world situation," he said, "requires the 
prompt enactment of practical and constitutional legislation which will 
give to the Department of Justice adequate weapons to deal with the 
precise dangers which we face, while preserving our traditions of 
personal liberty. We in the Department favor the general purpose of 
this type of legislation, but we do not feel that there is time enough 
remaining for novel experiments in law enforcement over a period of 
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years, with doubtful, meager, and inadequate results." Peyton Ford, 
the Assistant Attorney General, encouraged the President to approve 
H.R. 9490, claiming that even with the bad sections, the bill contained 
31 
essential legislation. The sense of national emergency, with its 
resulting disregard for civil liberties in favor of preserving internal 
security, had once again made itself felt within the President's cwn 
administration. 
The breakdown of support for civil liberties continued in 
September. Eight liberal Senators, among them Harley Kilgore, Estes 
Kefauver, and Hubert Humphrey, met with the President on September 6 to 
propose legislation which would fight McCarran's bill with one of their 
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cwn. To defeat McCarran, they proposed an "emergency detention" 
amendment to S. 4061, the administration bill. Their amendment gave 
the President, in the event of an officially declared national 
emergency, the power to intern persons believed likely to ocnmit acts 
of espionage or sabotage. The Senatorial group told the President that 
a move such as this was the only possible way of defeating the McCarran 
bill. Truman told them to go ahead with the proposal and he would 
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reserve judgment until the bill reached him. 
The Kilgore bill, which Spingarn called the "concentration camp" 
bill, illustrated the disintegration of the anti-McCarran forces as 
well as the way in which, by defining the debate in the terms which 
their opponents chose, ostensibly liberal figures contributed to public 
fears and to their cwn political disadvantage. These liberals adopted 
what they considered a politically sophisticated defense of civil 
liberties. In doing so, they attempted to defend civil liberties by 
restricting them, a position which proved untenable. According to the 
New Republic, the November elections had everything to do with the 
liberals' change of heart. Needing a politically attractive, "tough" 
plan, the Senators introduced the Kilgore measure to steal McCarran's 
thunder. Senator Lucas of Illinois, in a tough race with his 
Red-hunting opponent, Everett Dirksen, touted the substitute bill as an 
alternative to McCarran's bill, which did "not go far enough." When 
the bill failed as a substitute, Lucas shocked observers by introducing 
it as an amendment to the McCarran bill. These circumstances 
railroaded liberals in the Senate, after condemning the McCarran piece 
as ineffective and theirs as tough, into supporting the combination 
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measure. Only seven Senators found the courage to oppose the new 
Goliath. Only one of thirty-two Senators up for re-election, Herbert 
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Lehman (D-NY), voted no on the bill. 
As Congress approached the day of reckoning on the McCarran Act, 
the Truman administration pondered the consequences of the President 
either signing or vetoing the bill. Most observers had predicted the 
President would veto. Keeping in mind the "overwhelming sentiment for 
anti-oamrunist legislation," Truman's assistants discussed the 
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dilenma. Politically, support for the bill would mean that the 
President and many Democratic Congressmen would appear no less 
anti-ocmnunist than their opponents. A signature would also secure 
legislation needed for the internal security of the United States. Hie 
President's aides argued that defects, such as existed in the 
registration and immigration provisions, could be ironed out after 
passage. In addition, the President's approval of the McCarran Act did 
not necessarily mean a permanent blew to civil liberties. The 
President's advisers granted that the bill would give administrators a 
great deal of discretion to determine who was and who was not 
controlled by Cannunists. "But, of course," they said, "the Executive 
is supposed to have enough wisdem and authority to see that this 
discretion is handled properly." Any imprecision in the legislation 
would be straightened out by the courts. "It is quite possible," they 
admitted, "that seme innocent people will get hurt before the courts 
have completed this work. That is unfortunate, but at worst it is only 
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a temporary situation and does not in itself justify a veto." 
Despite arguments in favor of signature, the President's 
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administration had much more powerful and practical recommendations for 
vetoing the McCarran bill than they had for signing it. Politically, 
the President almost had to veto the bill. To sign would leave him 
exposed to the "booby traps" (administrative difficulties) of the bill, 
and charges that he sabotaged the McCarran Act would hurt the President 
in the 1952 elections. By signing the bill, Truman would also alienate 
liberal Senators such as Lehman, Carroll, and Helen Douglas, who had 
gone out on a limb for the President with their opposition to the 
legislation. Truman's aides argued that signing the bill would 
actually help the Ccrmnunists. The registration and immigration 
provisions of the act would make martyrs out of Communists. In the 
process of publicizing their persecution, the Ccriaunists might be able 
to run the FBI ragged, incriminate innocent people, and force 
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disclosure of government secrets. The President's aides also argued 
that giving unlimited discretion to administrative agencies, even 
though this discretion may be short-lived due to court decisions, was a 
bad idea. These agencies "may not, in all cases, be able to resist the 
pressure to proceed against groups and individuals who do not really 
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endanger our security." The White House had learned its lessons over 
the past few years, and was clearly wary of the possibility that the 
McCarran Act would be used to attack the people and policies associated 
with the New Deal. The recent growth of radical anti-Ccrrrrtunism and its 
attacks on New Deal Democrats warranted such concern. 
Congress passed the Internal Security Act of 1950 on September 20. 
Hie House passed the bill with a vote of 312 to 20, while the Senate 
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voted 51 to 7 for passage. Both Houses exceeded the required 
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two-thirds majority that would be needed to override a veto. 
Despite overwhelming support for the McCarran Act, President 
Truman decided to veto the bill. This decision, hewever, resulted not 
so much frcm any deeply held respect for the Constitution and civil 
liberties as frcm the fact that Truman had painted himself into a 
corner by equivocating on the matter and offering no clearly defined 
position of his own; he simply had no realistic alternative. Spingarn 
illustrated the President's dilemma clearly in a memo dated September 
20. "The signing of the bill," he said, "would represent an action of 
moral appeasement cn a matter of highest principle." Spingarn argued 
that having once yielded an basic principle, "the Administration would 
find it difficult to make a stand when the next 'aggression' in the 
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field of internal security legislative proposals took place." 
Spingarn's argument about "moral appeasement," while full of impressive 
rhetoric, actually demonstrated the predicament Truman had created for 
himself in the field of internal security. 
Spingarn drew the line beyond which the President's administration 
was unwilling to go with the McCarran Act, but the line may well have 
been drawn at any of a number of points in the past. Indeed, rather 
than drawing the line in, say, 1947, Truman and his administration 
participated in the degradation of civil liberties through their 
development of the loyalty program, their vacillation over the State 
Department files, and their consistent anti-Ccmnunist rhetoric. Hie 
McCarran Act offered the President his last chance to diminish the 
power of the anti-Catiriunists, to portray himself as a guardian of 
liberty, and at the same time to maintain his anti-camnunist 
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credentials. 
The idea of a ccnmissicn en internal security and individual 
rights recurred as part of the preparations for the veto. 
Representative Helen Douglas, a Democrat frcm California, wrote to 
President Truman, claiming that she and the other Representatives had 
voted against the McCarran Act because it would be ineffective and 
undermine civil liberties. She suggested that the President create a 
caimissicn to clear the air, calm hysteria, and offer a fresh solution 
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to the problem of internal security and individual rights. The Truman 
administration did not share Mrs. Douglas's noble intentions. 
According to Spingarn, Truman saw the proposal of a ccnmissicn as a 
strategic device to help sustain the veto. The President advised him, 
he said, "that he is favorably disposed toward the idea of announcing 
in the veto message that he was creating a Presidential Ccnmissicn on 
Internal Security and Individual Rights if this would help in getting 
the veto sustained." 1̂ 
A defender of the President might argue that the establishment of 
a ccnmissicn, in addition to being a popular measure, would also have 
served to remove the debate over internal security and civil liberties 
frcm the bitter fighting that existed between Congress and the White 
House. In fact, Senator Kilgore proposed that "the hearings and the 
report of a distinguished Carmission would raise the question above the 
level of partisan politics, put the initiative into the hands of the 
Administration, and permit the careful consideration of many important 
questions which have not yet received sufficient study and 
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attention." What Kilgore, Douglas, and perhaps others did not realize 
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was that putting the initiative into the hands of the administration 
would not, could not result in raising the issue above partisan 
politics. To the contrary, the "Gentleman frcm Pendergast" viewed his 
entire relationship with Congress in partisan terms, and pursued 
developments with the primary goal of gaining political advantage. 
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CHAPTER POUR 
The President delivered his veto message to Congress on September 
22. The text of the message indicated a lack of concern about the 
importance of maintaining civil liberties. The President's aides 
drafted the speech for him, and in the process of revising the drafts, 
actually downplayed the importance of individual rights. Spingarn 
commented that "the draft does not contain enough material emphasizing 
how the bill would actually hurt our internal security in proportion to 
the amount it contains about the danger done to our ancient liberties. 
For the history books there should be, of course, seme ringing phrases 
in the latter department but the arguments on the danger to internal 
security are much more effective today insofar as getting the veto 
sustained and convincing the country it is right is concerned."''" 
Spingarn's Garments revealed the administration's priorities, but they 
also revealed how the administration allowed its opponents to frame the 
debate. Perhaps if the White House under Truman exhibited a deep 
concern for basic civil liberties guaranteeed by the Constitution, the 
administration could have avoided the predicament in which it found 
itself. 
The President sent his veto message to each member of Congress 
double-spaced and printed on only one side of each page so as to make 
it easier to read. Truman included with each copy of the message a 
personal appeal from him asking that the Congressmen carefully study 
2 
the message before taking any action cm it. In his message, the 
President concentrated on the debilitating effect H.R. 9490 would have 
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on the internal security of the United States. Truman argued that 
despite Congressional arguments that the McCarran Act was an 
"anti-Qarmunist" or "Ccmnunist control" bill, the bill "would actually 
3 
weaken our existing internal security measures." The President used 
the same paradoxical logic in his veto that he had used in earlier 
efforts simultaneously to defend his administration and attack 
repressive Congressional proposals. That is, he emphasized the danger 
of the Ccmnunist threat and extolled the effectiveness of existing 
laws, all in the same breath. Speaking of the threat of Communism, he 
said, "Those dangers are serious, and must be met. But this bill would 
hinder us, not help us, in meeting them. Fortunately, we already have 
4 on the books strong laws..." This position presented an unclear 
picture to Congress and the public about where the administration stood 
on internal security and civil liberties. At best, it revealed the 
tendency of the Truman administration to compromise civil liberties or 
to seek a middle ground which, given the clearly articulated public 
mood, proved untenable. 
Truman contended the McCarran Act was harmful because it would 
require the publication of a complete list of vital defense 
installations to be protected in a time of national emergency. Truman 
said, "It is inconceivable to me that a majority of the Congress could 
expect the Cantmander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Uhited States 
to approve such a flagrant violation of proper security safeguards." 
The bill would also require that the Justice Department and the FBI 
waste an "immense" amount of resources enforcing its unworkable 
registration provisions. Interestingly, the President mentioned the 
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registration requirements' ineffectiveness first, and not their impact 
on civil liberties. His assistants had been making him aware of the 
constitutional problems which registering the Ccmnunists would raise 
since the original Mundt-Nixcn legislation in 1948. Truman argued that 
in trying to enforce those sections, the executive branch "would have 
to spend a great deal of time, effort, and money—all to no good 
„5 purpose." 
Hie President continued his assault cn the ineffectiveness of the 
McCarran bill by attacking the emergency detention provisions 
originally proposed by his stumbling liberal allies. "It may be," he 
said, "that legislation of this type should be on the statute books. 
But the provisions in H.R. 9490 would very probably prove ineffective 
to achieve the objective sought, since they would not suspend the writ 
of habeas corpus, and under our legal system to detain a nan not 
charged with a crime would raise serious constitutional questions 
unless the writ of habeas corpus were suspended. Furthermore, it may 
well be that other persons than those covered by these provisions would 
be more important to detain in the event of emergency."** In taking this 
path, Truman avoided criticizing a provision which almost begged to be 
picked apart on constitutional grounds, and instead claimed 
"ineffective" the section which his own assistant had termed a 
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"concentration-camp bill". It would be difficult to determine whether 
the President pursued this course out of consideration for the tenuous 
election-period positions of Kilgore, Lucas, and the other 
detenticn-provisen sponsors (thereby exhibiting his typical partisan 
loyalty) or whether he actually believed that the impracticality of the 
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provision was more important than its repressive character. 
Regardless, he missed a golden opportunity to emphasize the McCarran 
bill's threat to traditional American liberties. In doing so, Truman 
revealed more perhaps than he would have liked about his nonchalant 
attitude tcward individual rights. 
President Truman devoted a significant portion of his veto message 
to attacking the registration provisions of the McCarran bill — 
sections 1 through 17. These requirements, he said, were "about as 
Q 
practical as requiring thieves to register with the sheriff." Truman 
went on to attack the cumber sane legal proceedings which the Attorney 
General would have to endure in order to get the Subversive Activities 
Control Board to require an organization to register. He argued that 
the board would be bound by criteria which dealt with the attitudes or 
states of mind of an organization's leaders. Instead of inmediately 
raising constitutional questions concerning speech, association, and 
thought, such as the liberal press and even his advisors had been doing 
for two years with similar proposals, Truman criticized the 
impractical!ty of the provisions, comparing them to legal procedures 
concerning overt criminal acts. "Under this bill," he said, "the 
Attorney General would have to attempt the imnensely more difficult 
task of producing concrete legal evidence that men have particular 
ideas or opinions. This would inevitably require the disclosure of 
many of the FBI's confidential sources of information and thus would 
g 
damage our national security." 
The President did mention the threat which H.R. 9490 posed to 
civil liberties, devoting approximately one third of his speech to a 
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defense of constitutional rights. The significance of the ocrrments 
mentioned above lay in the fact that they revealed the President' s 
tendency to agree with the public's and Congress's desire for sane type 
of repressive legislation in order to control the Cannunists. He viewed 
the detention and registration provisions of the McCarran bill not 
primarily as affronts to fundamental American concerns for liberty and 
diversity but as statutes which suffered mainly frcm administrative 
flaws. 
That is not to say that Truman ignored the constitutional issues 
raised by the McCarran Act. He included the requisite "ringing phrases" 
suggested by Spingarn. He did not see the registration of the Ccmnunist 
Party itself a danger to civil liberties, but the President did assert 
that the registration requirements for Carittunist-frent organizations 
"can be the greatest danger to freedom of speech, press and assembly, 
since the Alien and Sedition Laws of 1798."^ The bill based the 
determination of which groups were and were not Carntuni st-f rent 
organizations cn criteria which examined solely "the extent to which 
the positions taken or advanced by it frcm time to time cn matters of 
policy do not deviate from those" of the Ccmnunist movement. 
Trunan was very concerned, as he and others had been in the past, 
that the bill would authorize a persecution of persons advocating 
liberal programs similar to the New Deal programs of the 1930's. 
However legitimate this concern, Truman failed to recognize that his 
loyalty program and the Attorney General's list had a comparable 
result. "This provision could easily be used to classify as a 
oemmuni st-f rant organization," said the President, "any organization 
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which is advocating a single policy or objective which is also being 
urged by the Ccmnunist Party or by a communist foreign government." As 
an example he cited "an organization which advocates lew-cost housing 
for sincere humanitarian reasons might be classified as a 
ocmnuni st-f rent organization because the caimunists regularly exploit 
slum conditions as one of their fifth-column techniques." The 
President argued that the registration sections possessed the basic 
flaw of moving the government in the direction of suppressing opinion 
and belief. This, he said, was a "long step" toward totalitarianism. 
"In a free country," Truman proclaimed, "we punish men for the crimes 
12 
they ccrmxt, but never for the opinions they have." Apparently the 
President felt that the Constitution protected New Deal Democrats but 
not Ccmnunist Party members. This revealed the basic flaw with 
Truman's (and many liberals') thinking. They defended their own and 
their allies' right to speech, but not Caimunists'. They undermined the 
real meaning of the First Amendment by concentrating on the politics of 
power rather than on an abstract defense of rights. 
Truman spent the remainder of his speech trying to convince 
Congress that existing laws were powerful enough to restrain the aims 
of the Carmunists. He also objected to seme provisions which added new 
standards of judging Ccmnunist behavior in the areas of immigration and 
natural!zaticn which, in Truman's words, "interfere with our relations 
with other countries and seriously damage our national security." 
Section 22 excluded anyone who advocated any form of totalitarian or 
one-party government. The President noted that the bill would exclude 
Spain, then on friendly terms with the United States, from carriercial 
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or cultural exchanges with the United States. Diplomatic exchanges 
would be sharply limited also, he argued. In fact, Truman said, 
section 22 was so broad it would actually require the deportation of 
any alien who operated a well-stocked bookshop containing the writings 
of loyal Spaniards or Yugoslavians. President Truman said that 
provisions such as section 22 would aid the Caimunist cause. "It will 
be to their advantage, and not ours, if we establish for ourselves an 
'iron curtain' against those who can help us in the fight for 
13 
freedom." The President closed his arguments with the observation 
that section 25 contained the provision that aliens would be eligible 
for naturalization as soon as they withdrew frcm organizations censored 
by the Attorney General. This weakened the current law, he argued, 
which required a ten-year wait after such withdrawal. 
The concerns which the President raised in his veto message and 
which the liberal press had predicted came to pass shortly after the 
McCarran Act became Public Law 831 on September 23, 1950. Congress's 
vote to override Truman's veto proceeded as expected, with few 
surprises. Congress received the veto message at 4:00 on Friday, 
September 22. Despite the President's request that the legislators 
review the message carefully, the House immediately voted to override 
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by a vote of 286 to 48. Congress was to adjourn cn Saturday, and 
would not reassemble until November 27. The battle over the bill in the 
Senate, therefore, needed to be resolved before adjournment in order 
for the legislation to provide suitable ammunition for election 
campaigns. The liberals needed to buy time in order for the message to 
have a significant impact on the public and thereby increase the 
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chances for sustaining the veto. Senators Humphrey, Douglas, Lehman, 
and the lane Republican, William Langer, filibustered for 22 hours. 
Langer eventually collapsed frcm exhaustion on the Senate floor and had 
to be taken to the hospital.^ The filibuster failed, and at 4:30 p.m. 
cn Saturday, the 24th, the Senate voted to override the President's 
veto by a vote of 57 to 10. Despite the overwhelming vote, the 
President's aides claimed a small victory, citing the message's 
16 favorable reception among the press. 
Thus ended the two and a half year battle between the White House 
and Congress over the content of internal security legislation. Hie 
President and the liberals in Congress had been "outsmarted," as the 
Nation put it. The liberal magazine noted that even the conservative 
press attacked the McCarran Act for its enforcement of conformity and 
orthodoxy. The Nation could no longer find praise for those Senators 
— Kilgore, Kefauver, Lucas and others — who had supported the 
emergency detention bill. Recognizing the powerful election pressures 
which drove the liberals to capitulate, the magazine claimed that "none 
of these considerations, we are certain, weighs against the folly of 
lending even tactical support to the McCarran monstrosity. The 
hysterical will not credit the Democrats with its passage in any case? 
so the Senate liberals have given moral ground to no purpose 
whatever."^ Senator Lucas appeared to validate the Nation's criticism 
when he explained his proposal to add the emergency detention provision 
to the McCarran bill with the lame justification that "the American 
people are anxious to have an anti-ccmnunist bill placed on the statute 
books. 
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As the President and the press had predicted, the McCarran Act was 
an ineffective and dangerous bill. The Ccmnunist Party refused to 
register, in accordance with earlier statements premising such action, 
and Attorney General McGrath responded to the Party's noncompliance 
19 
with a premise to pursue them "with the utmost vigor." One can make 
the argument that the Justice Department was acting so as to preclude 
Congressional accusations that the administration was soft cn 
Ccmnunists. On September 20, McGrath told the American Bar Associaticn 
that the United States Ccranunist Party had never been very big or 
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powerful and posed no major threat. The Ccranunist Party was not alone 
in its refusal to register. Not a single organization or individual 
came forward in the weeks following the bill's passage to register as 
subversive.^ 
The itimigraticn provisions were a disaster. The Nation claimed 
that the McCarran Act forced the immigration authorities "to make the 
country and its Congress look ludicrous before the world." In 1950, to 
detain an alien because of his or her past affiliation with a 
totalitarian organization meant that vast numbers of European refugees, 
victims of the disastrous political events surrounding World War II, 
would be detained at ports of entry such as Ellis Island. In the month 
following the enactment of the Internal Security Act, immigration 
authorities detained, among others, a concert pianist who at the age of 
ten had belonged to the Hitler Youth, a group of Italian musicians 
attempting to raise money for the Italian equivalent of Boys' Town, 
American soldiers' wives who had belonged to Nazi youth groups in their 
childhood, and German technicians sent to the United States by American 
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officials in Europe. Responding to this "public display of 
foolishness," the State Department cancelled all visas in October until 
22 the law could be interpreted more clearly. 
The predictions cn the part of the President's staff that the 
bill's unenforceable provisions would be used against the 
administration by its Congressional opponents came true. In response 
to the problems engendered by the immigration provisions, Senator 
Ferguson accused the administration of trying to undermine the McCarran 
23 
Act by, essentially, trying to enforce it! Senator McCarran accused 
the administration of trying to discredit the law because inmigraticn 
authorities refused to allow Spanish immigrants into the United States 
who were or had once been members of Spanish dictator Francisco 
24 
Franco's Falange. 
The passage of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the problems 
which resulted from it did not reduce the desire of President Truman to 
control the debate over internal security and individual liberty. With 
his position as a defender of internal security severely weakened by 
the vote to override, Truman played his last hand — he sought to 
25 
create a Carmission on Internal Security and Individual Rights. He 
created the ocranission ostensibly to examine the issues created by the 
conflict between the need for internal security and the desire to 
preserve individual rights. As noted before, though, the President and 
his supporters viewed the idea of a ccmnission frcm a vantage point 
which emphasized the opportunity to gain political advantage rather 
than to secure the rights of American citizens. 
In the aftermath of the elections, the White House received 
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letters frcm influential citizens advocating the establishment of a 
ccnmissicn. Benjamin Kaplan, a law professor at Harvard, wrote that 
Truman could respond to the McCarran Act and the elections with a 
26 
ocmmissian that would "build up sentiment over a fairly lcng pull." 
Max Kampelman, legislative counsel to Hubert Humphrey, wrote that the 
election results pointed to more McCarthyism in American politics. 
Appointing a commission, he argued, would "take the sails frcm their 
27 
attack." These well-intenticned intellectuals fell prey to the same 
mispercepticns as the administration had. They observed the debate 
over civil liberties and internal security to be erne between the "good 
guys" (themselves) and the "bad guys" (hard-line anti-oannunists). 
Such a perspective blinded them to the possibility that their 
solutions, like those of their enemies, might be detrimental to civil 
liberties. A oatmission would not necessarily elevate the debate above 
politics, but to liberals such a structure would definitely remove the 
issues frcm their opponents' control. Wearing these political 
"blinders" made liberals see wresting control over the liberty/security 
debate to be cne and the same as striking a blew for the Constitution. 
In fact, they were carpeting for control of the system, rather than 
defending liberty in the abstract. 
The Truman administration also saw the battle between civil 
liberties and internal security to be the same as one between the White 
House and congressional conservatives, which contributed to the 
politicizaticn of a debate which did not necessarily require such 
distortion. David Bell wrote to Charles Murphy supporting the 
appointment by the President of a Carmissicn on Internal Security and 
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Individual Rights. This should be done, he said, before Congress 
reassembled. In the same letter Bell suggested that Truman should make 
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a point of the ccnmissicn1 s being above politics. Bell advocated, 
essentially, that an effective strategy in the President's war with 
Congressional hard-liners would be to make the ccnmissicn appear above 
anything smacking of strategy. 
Murphy himself wrote to the President suggesting the same thing — 
that a ocmmissian should be appointed before an increasingly hostile 
Congress reconvened. Murphy pointed out that Senators McCarthy and 
Ferguson wanted to extend their investigation of subversion in the 
government beyond the State Department to the Department of Agriculture 
and the Bureau of the Budget. "In my judgment," he said, "the 
appointment of a Carmissicn of outstanding citizens, frcm both major 
political parties, would effectively counteract such political 
charges. The findings of the Ccnmissicn would undoubtedly strongly 
endorse the effectiveness of the President's Loyalty Program. Because 
such a Ccnmissian could not be attacked as partisan, its judgment would 
carry great public weight and be a firm reliance for Democratic 
candidates in 1952." Murphy admitted that a ccnmissicn "cannot be 
expected to shut the Republicans up," but went cn to argue that the 
ccnmissicn "would help to shew up the Republicans as unpatriotic 
politicians, ready to undermine their government to gain votes — which 
29 
is in large degree the truth of the matter." One might well have 
levelled Murphy's charges of demagoguery against the Truman 
administration itself, especially given the President's oc- jtent 
anti-ocmnunist rhetoric. 
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Hie Ccnmissicn on Internal Security and Individual Rights, or the 
Nimitz Ccnmissicn as it came to be called, inevitably suffered frcm the 
very partisanship which it ostensibly sought to overcome. In order to 
be effective, the ccnmissicn required the service of highly visible 
individuals who were familiar with the workings of government, internal 
security, and law. These persons, due to the nature of their skills, 
tended to do business with the government. It was therefore necessary 
that the President obtain exemptions frcm the various 
conflict-of-interest laws for people whom he wished to appoint to the 
ccnmissicn. Unfortunately, Truman needed the approval of the chairman 
of the Senate Judiciary Ccnmittee, Senator Pat McCarran, in order to 
obtain the exemptions. In a letter to McCarran, the President pointed 
out that exemptions frcm ccnf li ct-of-interest laws were far frcm 
unprecedented. Truman noted Admiral Nimitz's observation that persons 
involved in government service had recently obtained exemptions frcm 
both the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Federal Civil Defense 
30 
Act of 1950. While the House was willing to pass legislation 
exempting ocrmission members frcm ocaif li ct-of-interest laws, McCarran 
blocked efforts in the Senate to do the same, and June of 1951 saw the 
end of Truman's efforts to bolster his reputation in the area of 
31 
internal security and civil liberties. 
Truman's veto of the McCarran Act and his subsequent efforts to 
regain political advantage through the establishment of a cammissicn cn 
internal security and individual rights demonstrated that the 
President, despite his occasional rhetoric supporting civil lib°r es, 
did not regard individual liberties in the United States arr ~op 
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priority of his administration. Through his veto message and the 
ocnmissiori Truman sought to attain what moral high ground he could, 
given the depths to which the debate over internal security and 
individual rights had sunk. But this moral superiority, couched as a 
defense of the Constitution, was more a political ploy than a genuinely 
felt sentiment. The President himself was guilty of undermining the 
spirit of the Constitution, as were his opponents in Congress, through 
their disregard for civil liberties in favor of the more popular, 
politically safe repression of free thought. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Truman administration' s treatment of the debate between 
internal security and civil liberties revealed much about presidential 
politics during the Truman era. Harry Truman brought his machine 
background to the White House, and his loyalty to the Democratic Party, 
along with his cwn anti-ocmnunism, led him to see his opponents as a 
threat to civil liberties but to disregard the impact, at heme and 
abroad, of his cwn efforts to combat Ccmnunism. 
Truman not only failed to ccxnbat the repression of civil liberties 
in America, he contributed to it through his federal loyalty program, 
Smith Act prosecutions, and strident anti-ccmraunist rhetoric. Truman 
competed with conservatives in Congress for the support of Americans 
who favored the vigorous prosecution of the Cold War at heme as well as 
abroad. In the process, the President contributed to public hysteria 
and undermined his own position. Frcm its inception in March 1947 
until 1952, the loyalty program served to undermine American civil 
liberties, despite standards which ostensibly protected those employees 
undergoing invetigaticn. Employees were denied the right to confront 
their accusers or examine evidence brought against them, due to the 
program's emphasis cn protecting investigations rather than suspects. 
Hie Attorney General possessed unchecked authority to list subversive 
organizations without public justification or appeal. Such measures 
served to restrict the association of rederal employees with any 
unorthodox causes and created a climate of fear and suspicion. jMs 
tendency came about largely because of the President's enphasis cn both 
84 
85 
internal security and political expediency. 
President Truman's reaction to Joseph McCarthy's demand to examine 
State Department loyalty files illustrated hew Truman pursued political 
advantage while at times using the rhetoric of civil liberties to do 
so. McCarthy charged that spies infested the State Department with 
Secretary of State Dean Ache son's approval and that a simple 
examination of the Department' s files would reveal this to be the 
case. The President initially refused to release the files, claiming 
that the separation of pewers established by the Constitution protected 
the executive branch frcm such intrusion. Truman's administrative 
assistants provided additional support for the President's position 
with the argument that the files contained unproven information and 
that to release this information to the public would unfairly punish 
innocent individuals. By taking this approach, Truman portrayed 
himself as the protector of the Constitution and individual rights. As 
the pressure to defend his office mounted, however, the President 
succumbed to McCarthy's insistence and allowed a Senate suboarmittee to 
examine the files, claiming that the files had been examined years 
earlier by Congress and thus did not constitute a breach of the 
separation of pewers. Abdication or no, such action cn the part of 
President Truman revealed his defense of civil liberties to be more 
rhetoric than conviction, and which served as a political tool in his 
battle with Congress. 
The battle between the Truman administration and Congress over 
internal security legislation between 1948 and 1950 culminated in the 
passage of the McCarran Act over the President's veto cn September 24, 
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1950. Hie episode revealed that Truman's concentration cn political 
advantage over civil liberties, as illustrated by the loyalty program 
and the State Department files, was a consistent trend. Beginning with 
the Mundt-Nixon bill, H.R. 5852, in 1948, conservatives in Congress 
attempted to outlaw the Ccranunist Party by, in effect, simultaneously 
requiring its members to register their affiliation and making 
membership in the party illegal. The Truman administration initially 
responded to this effort with constitutional arguments which mirrored 
those of the liberal press. The Mundt-Nixon bill (and its successors 
in 1949 and 1950) threatened not just to deny First Amendment 
protection to Communists, but to liberal ideas as well. The arbitrary 
actions of the proposed Subversive Activities Control Board could quite 
easily violate Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses during a 
jury trial. The Hobbs bill threatened the Fifth Amendment's protection 
against self-incrimination by requiring suspects to divulge their 
"associations and activities." 
While liberals kept haxrmering away at the repressive provisions of 
the proposed legislation, the administration hesitated, vacillated, and 
equivocated in an attempt to gain political advantage over 
congressional conservatives. Truman's assistants in the White House 
sought ways to mitigate the harmful effects that the Alger Hiss case, 
Soviet nuclear capability, the Ccranunist takeover in China, and 
eventually the Korean war had on the administration's anti-ccranunist 
reputation. In doing so, the Truman administration shifted away from 
direct confrontation with Congressional conservatives to a more 
politically neutral position advocating "balance" between internal 
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security and individual rights. Such a tactic sacrificed civil 
liberties for political advantage and revealed the President's true 
priorities. 
The Korean War combined with upccrning elections to instigate an 
intensification of efforts on the part of Congress to pass sane type of 
internal security legislation. Truman responded to those efforts with 
a security message to Congress which argued that yes, there were sane 
improvements to be made in the existing security laws, but by and large 
current laws were effective enough to combat subversion. Furthermore, 
the President argued, pending legislation would not only harm 
individual rights, it would have the detrimental effect of hindering 
investigative efforts by driving the Caimunists underground. Truman's 
speech was designed to make him appear both tough on Ccmnunism and 
concerned about civil liberties. 
In order to ccmbat Congressional conservatives, the administration 
offered its own bill, reflected the recommendations contained in the 
President's security message. In addition to the administration's 
efforts, liberal senators proposed a "concentration camp" bill which 
would allow the President, in the event of a national emergency, to 
intern persons he suspected were likely to commit sabotage. The 
President's bill died in ocnmittee, and the "liberals'" bill became 
attached to the McCarran proposal. Congress passed the bill by a wide 
margin on September 20. 
Truman was now faced with the problem of whether to veto the 
McCarran bill or not, and his decision to veto, as well as his veto 
message, revealed his desire to maintain as much political advantage as 
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possible. After the fierce struggle over the McCarran Act in Congress, 
Truman could not accept it. Yet he needed to maintain his cwn 
anti-carmunist credentials. Thus, in his veto, the President failed to 
concentrate on the threat to civil liberties which the McCarran Act 
posed; instead he emphasized the bill's ineffectiveness. This approach 
tended to validate Congress' repression of individual rights. Not 
surprisingly, his half-hearted effort failed, and early in the morning 
of September 24 the Internal Security Act of 1950 became law. Truman 
continued to try to gain political advantage with the establishment of 
a ccnmissicn to study the subject of internal security and individual 
rights, but even that effort suffered frcm the partisan nature of 
Truman's administration. 
The administration of President Truman expressed a concern for 
civil liberties which, while greater than that of its Congressional 
opponents, fell short of a principled defense of individual rights. 
Instead, Truman adopted the notion that, in order to ccnpete with 
Congress during a period of Cold War hysteria, seme rights, including 
the right of association, the right to confront witnesses, and the 
right to due process, had to be abridged. "The buck steps here" was a 
slogan of Harry Truman's, meaning that he and no one else would be 
responsible for his actions. If one holds Truman accountable for his 
policies cn internal security, one cannot ignore the role he played in 
undermining civil liberties. 
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